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Beyond Sexual Humanitarianism:
A Postcolonial Approach to
Anti-Trafficking Law
Prabha Kotiswaran*
This Article examines from a postcolonial perspective a deep paradox in contemporary
anti-trafficking law and discourse. The inordinate attention on trafficking in Western
industrialized economies is disproportionate to the extent of the problem. Only 7% of the world’s
20.9 million forced laborers are in developed economies and the EU while 56% are in Asia
Pacific. Yet in BRIC countries like India with a substantial majority of the world’s trafficked
victims and where 90% of all trafficking is domestic, trafficking has little policy resonance.
Trafficking was only recently criminalized as part of India’s extensive rape law reforms. India,
however, remains an active site for sexual humanitarianism as American evangelical groups and
local police dramatically raid and rescue ‘female sex slaves’ from gritty big-city brothels. As
developing countries increasingly shape international anti-trafficking law and policy, this Article
proposes two ways whereby the postcolony could be far more than a site of sexual
humanitarianism. First, I offer India’s bonded, contract and migrant labor laws as a robust
labor law model against trafficking that could inform international legal developments. This is in
contrast to the criminal justice model propagated by the UN Trafficking Protocol worldwide.
Second, through a case study of Indian sex workers’ mobilization against trafficking through selfregulatory boards in a red-light area, I show how sex workers are not simply passive victims and
that community-based initiatives that make sparing use of criminal law could prove more effective
than conventional anti-trafficking strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
The third world sex worker enslaved in a big-city brothel has captured the
imagination of many a crusader in the contemporary battle against human
trafficking for sex work or “modern slavery.” Developing countries figure
prominently in this landscape of sexual humanitarianism1 during a period that
some scholars label as fostering a global sex panic.2 Journalists like Nicholas
Kristof of the New York Times have published over forty-six op-eds in recent
years on the subject of “sex trafficking.”3 An indefatigable opponent of sex
slavery, Kristof has gone so far as to purchase the freedom of sex workers from
the brothels of third world countries, content that such sex workers found an
alternate livelihood in running small shops of trinkets for tourists.4 In 2011, he
reported on his undercover raids along with a U.S. abolitionist5 organization, the
1. This term is coined by Nicola Mai. See Nick Mai, Between Embodied Cosmopolitanism and Sexual
Humanitarianism, in BORDERS, MOBILITIES AND MIGRATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
MEDITERRANEAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY 175, 176–77 (Lisa Anteby-Yemini et al. eds., 2014).
2. See generally JO DOEZEMA, SEX SLAVES AND DISCOURSE MASTERS 124–27 (2010); Ronald
Weitzer, Moral Crusade Against Prostitution, SOCIETY, Mar.–Apr. 2006, 33, 33–38.
3. This term is used to connote trafficking for the purposes of sex work. This terminology is
not without problem; I will allude to the stakes in the terminology used to describe trafficking later in
this Article.
4. See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: HOW TO CHANGE THE
WORLD, at xviii–xix (2010); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Leaving the Brothel Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2005, at A19.
5. Many opponents of sex work invoke antislavery discourse to advocate for eliminating sex
work altogether irrespective of the conditions under which women perform it. They have
appropriated this term to invoke the moral charge of the term “slavery” to propose a neo-abolitionist
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International Justice Mission, in Sonagachi, Kolkata’s largest red-light area. There
he claimed to have “transformed” the lives of five girls, two of whom were hours
away from their first rape, part of a series of rapes.6 Kristof’s very insistence on a
series of conflations between trafficking, trafficking for sex work, sex work and
what he calls modern-day slavery in the developing world, and the moral urgency
and raid and rescue strategies which sustain them, are paradigmatic of the state of
most anti-trafficking interventions today. Journalists are not the only ones
engaging in sexual humanitarianism. Gloria Steinem called on Indian policymakers
to criminalize customers of sex workers.7 Indian activists themselves also actively
participate in cultivating this imagery of Indian women’s victimhood and are key
transnational players in their own right. In 2013, Sunitha Krishnan, the founder of
an abolitionist Indian nongovernmental organization (NGO), Prajwala, traveled to
New York to receive a lifetime achievement award from the New York based
Diller-von Furstenberg Family Foundation for her work against “sex trafficking.”8
Many postcolonial scholars have powerfully countered this abolitionist
discourse by forefronting the agency of third world actors, especially sex workers.9
This Article adds significantly to this critique by going beyond the assumption that
developing countries are simply the fields on which deeply ideological positions
over women’s sexuality gets played out or are sources of migrant labor most likely
to be affected by trafficking, which, according to international law, involves the
recruitment or transportation of a person under threat of coercion for purposes of
a variety of exploitative practices.10 Instead, I consider the domestic legal response
position against prostitution by analogizing it to modern day slavery. See Janet Halley et al., From the
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 338–39 n.7 (2006).
6. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Raiding a Brothel in India, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at
A35.
7. See Prostitution Is Commercial Rape, Says Gloria Steinem, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Jan. 29,
2014, 19:43 IST), http://www.financialexpress.com/news/prostitution-is-commercial-rape-saysgloria-steinem/1221602.
8. See Accolades, PRAJWALA, http://www.prajwalaindia.com/accolades.html.
9. See RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF
POSTCOLONIALISM 128–34 (2005); Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction to TRAFFICKING AND
PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION, SEX WORK, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, at vii, xxviii–xxx (Kamala Kempadoo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
10. Although a social problem of considerable vintage, trafficking as a contemporary
international problem has spilled over into the popular consciousness and assumed its potent charge
only in the past decade. Given the scale of the problem of trafficking, hundreds of millions of dollars
are spent annually on dealing with it. For instance, between 2001 and 2007, the U.S. government
alone spent $447 million in foreign assistance to NGOs, international organizations, and foreign
governments. Gergana Danailova-Trainor & Frank Laczko, Trafficking in Persons and Development:
Towards Greater Policy Coherence, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 38, 58 (2010). Some estimates suggest that 1.3
million people are trafficked worldwide, including those trafficked domestically. Id. at 57. The U.N.
Population Fund estimates that between 700,000 and two million women are trafficked across
international borders annually, and when internal trafficking is included, the number increases to four
million. Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2982 n.13 (2006). The U.S. government estimates that 600,000
to 800,000 persons are trafficked across international borders annually. Elizabeth M. Wheaton et al.,
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to the problem of internal trafficking in one developing world context, namely
India, with a view to substantively informing how we might conceptualize the
contours of anti-trafficking law more broadly. I suggest that as the U.N. Protocol
continues its diffusion internationally, such an exercise will become increasingly
essential to a theory of anti-trafficking law that aspires to go beyond sexual
humanitarianism.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-TRAFFICKING DISCOURSE
A. Anti-Trafficking Discourse: Need for a View from the Developing World
So how did we get to a situation where a Facebook game inspired by
Kristof’s book Half the Sky today raises public awareness on child prostitution and
female genital mutilation?11 As documented extensively, almost ten years ago,

Economics of Human Trafficking, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 114, 118 (2010). It further estimates that 80% of
trafficked individuals are women and girls and 50% are minors. Id. Meanwhile, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the number of people working in forced labor due to
trafficking is 2.45 million while there are 9.8 to 14.8 million people working as forced laborers. See
Jacqueline Berman, The Left, the Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of U.S. Antitrafficking in Persons Policy,
14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269, 284 (2006). The ILO projects that 43% of those trafficked for
forced labor are forced into commercial sexual exploitation while only 11% of those in forced labor
are in commercial sexual exploitation. Id. The U.S. Department of State once estimated that 50,000
women and children are trafficked into the United States each year, but current estimates have scaled
the numbers down to a figure of between 14,500 and 17,500 victims. Denise Brennan, Key Issues in the
Resettlement of Formerly Trafficked Persons in the United States, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1581, 1589 n.25 (2010).
Yet the meager use of the T-visas so far further puts these figures into question. See id. at 1589. For
rejections of the data surrounding trafficking, see David A. Feingold, Trafficking in Numbers: The Social
Construction of Human Trafficking Data, in SEX, DRUGS AND BODY COUNTS: THE POLITICS OF
NUMBERS IN GLOBAL CRIME AND CONFLICT 47 (Peter Andreas & Kelly M. Greenhill eds., 2010)
(characterizing the trafficking field as “one of numerical uncertainty and statistical doubt”); Ernesto
U. Savona & Sonia Stefanizzi, Introduction to MEASURING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 2, 2 (Ernesto U.
Savona & Sonia Stefanizzi eds., 2007) (compiling essays showing that available information on
trafficking is “fragmentary, heterogeneous, difficult to acquire, uncorrelated and often outdated”). A
report released in August 2010 by the British Association of Chief Police Officers similarly reported
finding 2,600 women out of a total of 30,000 sex workers from the off-street prostitution sector being
trafficked for sex work. KEITH JACKSON ET AL., SETTING THE RECORD: THE TRAFFICKING OF
MIGRANT WOMEN IN THE ENGLAND AND WALES OFF-STREET PROSTITUTION SECTOR 5 (2010),
available at http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2010/201008critmw01.pdf. Underlying
these highly varied estimates of the problem of trafficking, however, is the acknowledgment, even by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the only U.N. entity focusing on the
criminal justice aspects of trafficking, that the data on the extent of the problem is woefully
inadequate. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf. The UNODC attributes this inadequacy to the lack of
international standardization of definitions along the lines of the U.N. Protocol, the failure of even
countries with similar legal systems to count the same things, and countries’ failures to include
domestic crimes amounting to trafficking within their data. Id. at 11. For a different take on the very
phenomenon of trafficking as a discrete empirical reality, see DOEZEMA, supra note 2, at 5–15
(detailing the discursive effects of anti-trafficking rhetoric and the myth of trafficking).
11. Elizabeth Jensen, A Game Aims to Draw Attention to Women’s Issues, N.Y. TIMES, February
18, 2013, at B5.
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governance feminists12 within the Violence Against Women (VAW) movement
were richly rewarded for their efforts in mainstreaming women’s rights within
human rights discourse when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 2000
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Against
Persons, Especially Women and Children (U.N. Protocol)13 supplementing the
2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,14 on
November 15, 2000.15 The negotiations leading up to the Protocol and its
immediate aftermath were characterized by an ideologically charged debate over
what constitutes trafficking, especially in relation to prostitution. The U.S.
legislature, meanwhile, passed the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act, 2000 (VTVPA).16 Given the dominance of the United States in the
international arena, the negotiation of the U.N. Protocol reflected largely
American feminist debates on sex work, prostitution, and trafficking.17
Compromises were brokered between abolitionist feminists on the one hand, and
human rights activists (along with some sex worker advocates) on the other. Both
camps cautiously welcomed the final Protocol as a success for their advocacy
efforts.18
Even as the U.N. Protocol rapidly found signatories, it resulted in a
substantial reallocation of state resources and punitive powers. A global panic
around sex work and trafficking, fostered largely by U.S. foreign policy and
indirectly through the naming and shaming techniques of U.S. anti-trafficking law,
led to the constant conflation of trafficking with trafficking for sex work and of
trafficking for sex work with sex work. Sex work was and continues to be
presented, particularly by abolitionist feminists, not only as exploitative per se, but
also as the most horrific form of modern-day slavery. Further, the initiative of
radical feminists in speaking about women as uniquely harmed by sex morphed

12. Janet Halley has explained the concept of governance feminism (GF):
GF is, I think, an underrecognized but important fact of governance more generally in the
early twenty-first century. I mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite
noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. It
takes many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others;
some are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they want—far
from it—but neither are they helpless outsiders. Rather, as feminist legal activism comes of
age, it accedes to a newly mature engagement with power.
Halley et al., supra note 5, at 340.
13. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 60, U.N. Doc A/55/49 (Dec. 23, 2000).
14. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000,
T.I.A.S. No. 13, 127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
15. For an elaboration of the relationship between the international treatment of sex
trafficking and the international violence against women movement and human rights movement, see
KAPUR, supra note 9, at 95; Halley et al., supra note 5, at 352.
16. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 106,
114 Stat. 1464, 1474 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)).
17. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and AntiTrafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010).
18. For a delineation of these feminist positions, see PRABHA KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS
SEX, INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN INDIA 67–156 (2011).
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into a primary concern of the U.S. government and the Christian Right
internationally.19 The emergence of a neoliberal sexual agenda meant that social
problems are located in deviant individuals rather than mainstream institutions
thus necessitating criminal justice interventions rather than redistributive reforms
from the welfare state.20 The abolitionist framing of trafficking as involving
women and girls forced into sexual slavery by social deviants21 has deflected
attention from the migration patterns of low-income women and men who
undertake risky migration for work in exploitative informal employment.22
Consequently, the implementation of anti-trafficking law by many countries has
been both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because it targets
women engaged in voluntary sex work. It is underinclusive because trafficking for
purposes other than sex work is effectively ignored and rendered less worthy of
our attention. As such unintended consequences of feminist advocacy mount,
feminists in the human rights movement have conceded the errors of their
strategies.23 Whether unwittingly or otherwise, it is now apparent that having let
the genie out of the bottle, feminists are struggling to prevent issues of women’s
violence from being used to stage disputes between states such as border control,
immigration, and the negative externalities of globalization even as conservative
domestic alliances are consolidated. Thus, in the several years since the U.N.
Protocol came into force, despite efforts to legislate against trafficking
internationally, regionally, and domestically, anti-trafficking law seems to have set
itself up for failure.
Indeed, human rights scholars like James Hathaway have questioned why the
“pluralist nongovernmental voices around the international negotiating table were
so preoccupied by internecine conflict with the abolitionists over the legitimacy of
sex work” to the neglect of “serious negative human rights externalities” built into
the trafficking and migrant smuggling protocols.24 Feminists like Janie Chuang and
Anne Gallagher have defended their positions in the Protocol negotiations by
elaborating on the range of nonabolitionist perspectives at the negotiations and
how human rights activists did their best to support the human rights of sex
workers especially against state abuse.25 Yet, they “became embroiled in [the]

19. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make
Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 17, 36 (2004).
20. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES: J.
FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 128, 137 (2007).
21. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1658.
22. Id. at 1659.
23. See Miller, supra note 19, at 36–37.
24. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
46 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
25. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672–77; Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human
Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 789–91
(2009).
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highly divisive battles” over prostitution reform26 while being forced to “defend[]
against partisan attacks.”27
One has to be cognizant of the constrained circumstances under which
human rights and sex workers’ groups functioned during the U.N. Protocol
negotiations, which Gallagher has alluded to in recent writing.28 Indeed, it is no
small feat to have fundamentally shifted states’ attitudes toward trafficking, which
they viewed as involving “bad people,” to seeing it as a human rights problem,
which affects not just women and children in prostitution.29 Moreover, advocates
were negotiating what was essentially a crime control treaty in the context of the
U.N. Crime Commission’s division of the issues of trafficking and migration into
two different protocols whereby trafficking was understood as nonconsensual and
smuggling as consensual. Interestingly, even as some feminists continue to occupy
and navigate the ideological fallout of the U.N. Protocol and the VTVPA,30 others
have assumed a more pragmatic stance towards these legal frameworks, which are
here to stay and have therefore set about assessing how they can be made more
effective.31
I suggest that although we cannot unwind what is essentially the criminal law
architecture of the U.N. Protocol, and its diffusion of the U.N. Protocol
worldwide,32 its definitional ambivalence presents us with an interesting
opportunity for intervention. International organizations such as the U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the guardian of the Protocol, and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) are returning to the drawing board once
again to identify core aspects of the definition of trafficking under Article 3 of the
U.N. Protocol. After all, the Open-ended Interim Working Group on the U.N.
Protocol has observed that “important concepts contained in the Protocol are not
clearly understood and, therefore, are not being consistently implemented and
applied.”33 Not surprisingly then, the UNODC has recently admitted its lack of

26. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672.
27. Id.
28. See Gallagher, supra note 25, at 789–91.
29. See id. at 825–26.
30. See PARDIS MAHDAVI, GRIDLOCK: LABOR, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN
DUBAI 18, 27 (2011); RHACEL SALAZAR PARREÑAS, ILLICIT FLIRTATIONS: LABOR, MIGRATION
AND SEX TRAFFICKING IN TOKYO 51–55 (2011).
31. See Janie A. Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 1627, 1639–41, 1649–56 (2010); Anne T. Gallagher, Improving the Effectiveness of the International
Law of Human Trafficking: A Vision for the Future of the US Trafficking in Persons Reports, 12 HUM. RTS.
REV. 381, 390–97 (2011).
32. For a rather particularized view of this diffusion process, see generally PAULETTE LLOYD
ET AL., THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE CASE OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING 3–5 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910623
(using GPS data on road connectivity to argue that criminalization of human trafficking has diffused
along tangible networks).
33. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ISSUE PAPER: ABUSE OF A POSITION
OF VULNERABILITY AND OTHER “MEANS” WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF TRAFFICKING IN
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data on the phenomenon of trafficking, the magnitude of the problem, and the
uneven nature of domestic law reform undertaken to conform to states’
obligations under the Trafficking Protocol.34 This has led the UNODC to
commission three Issue Papers on core concepts central to the definition of
trafficking under Article 3, namely “the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability,” “consent,” and “exploitation.” Similarly, in 2013, the ILO
organized a Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Forced Labour and Trafficking for
Labour Exploitation35 to advise the ILO on whether standard setting was essential
to supplement the ILO’s forced labor conventions to address trafficking for labor
exploitation.36 I will refer to their debates over the conceptual inter-relationship
between forced labor and trafficking in a subsequent section. Given that only
some of the central concepts in the definition of trafficking are of legal vintage in
contexts other than trafficking (e.g., consent in rape law, fraud in contract law),37 it
is clear for the time being that the very parameters of the offence of trafficking
and its scope38 continue to be up for grabs.
It is precisely against this backdrop that I suggest taking seriously the
perspective of developing countries in relation to anti-trafficking law. For one, we
might recollect that the international legal response to trafficking and its default
understanding of trafficking for purposes of sex work has a long history, which,

PERSONS 6 (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2012/
UNODC_2012_Issue_Paper_-_Abuse_of_a_Position_of_Vulnerability.pdf.
34. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 6–7.
35. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., REPORT FOR DISCUSSION AT THE
TRIPARTITE MEETING OF EXPERTS CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE ADOPTION OF AN ILO INSTRUMENT TO SUPPLEMENT THE FORCED LABOUR CONVENTION, 1930 (No.29) ¶ 1 (2013), available at
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms
_203982.pdf.
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of concepts central to rape law such as consent and coercion, see
RETHINKING RAPE LAW INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17–29 (Clare
McGlynn & Vanessa Munro eds., 2010). For a dizzying array of ways in which the definition of
trafficking is incorporated in the domestic legal jurisdictions of several countries, see UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 30–75. The paper categorizes countries into
those whose domestic laws conform to the U.N. Protocol definition, those that contain fewer means
than listed in the Protocol, those that do away with the means of trafficking, and those whose legal
situation is unclear. See id. at 30.
38. Human rights lawyers further observe that despite the passage of the trafficking and
migrant smuggling protocols, fundamental questions linger as to what trafficking is about, how it
differs from migrant smuggling, how it relates to the criminalization of irregular migrants, whether
asylum seekers can be smuggled or trafficked and whether trafficking and migrant smuggling should
be treated as a human rights issue or an international criminal justice issue. See Anne Gallagher,
Human Rights and the New U.N. Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23
HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 977 (2001). Bridget Anderson alludes to early commentators who viewed the
failure of the two Protocols to provide any guidance on identification to be a significant and
deliberate weakness. Bridget Anderson, Motherhood, Apple Pie and Slavery: Reflections on the Trafficking
Debates 4 (Ctr. on Migration, Policy and Soc’y, Working Paper No. 48, 2007), available at
http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2007/Bridget%20
Anderson%20WP0748.pdf.
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amongst other things, was negotiated and operationalized in the colonies of
several Western countries.39 Thus, the U.N. Protocol is the latest initiative in this
long history of anti-trafficking law. Second, to the extent that the U.N. Protocol
has been used as an instrument of border control by developed countries against
migrants from developing countries, the voice of developing countries in
reorienting trafficking in terms of a problem of labor migration has been limited.
Many scholars have underlined the significance of immigration law reform and
labor law reform in host states to strengthen the bargaining potential of migrant
workers, especially undocumented workers. The International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of
1990 seeks precisely to do this, but has only forty-six parties to date who are
essentially states of origin. On the other hand, to the extent that the U.N. Protocol
on Trafficking has been exceptionally popular with developed countries,40
creatively redrawing the legal lines around the definition of trafficking may well
benefit migrant workers.
Indications are that developing countries are increasingly playing a significant
role in reimagining anti-trafficking law. In a major development that holds much
promise, the Governing Body of the ILO placed the issue of supplementing the
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) on the agenda of the 103rd session of
the International Labour Conference.41 Significantly, developing countries,
particularly Brazil, played an important role in the discussions based on which the
expert committee report recommended standard setting to the Governing Body.42
Brazil’s role in this context and its ability to generate best practices against
trafficking over the years is hardly surprising given the sheer magnitude of the
phenomenon of trafficking in developing countries, particularly the emerging
economies. For instance, according to the ILO, forced labor, one of the forms of
exploitation listed in Article 3, is to be found largely in Asia and the Pacific. Thus,
in 2005, of the 8.1 million victims of forced labor (excluding sex work) the world
over, nearly 6.2 million were in the Asia-Pacific region while the industrialized
39. See ASHWINI TAMBE, CODES OF MISCONDUCT: REGULATING PROSTITUTION IN LATE
COLONIAL BOMBAY 69 (2009) (describing how the League of Nations took on trafficking in women
and children in 1920 as part of its mandate, necessitating reporting by thirty-three countries to the
League of Nations).
40. By all means, the diffusion of the U.N. Protocol has been a rapid process. According to
the UNODC, the Protocol has had a huge push effect on countries’ formulation of anti-trafficking
law. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of countries with a specific offence of trafficking in persons
doubled. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 8. Similarly, the number
of countries with national action plans on trafficking exploded from 5% to 53% between 2003 and
2008. Id. at 25.
41. Int’l Labour Org., Decision on the Second Item on the Agenda: Agenda of the International Labour
Conference, INT’L LAB. ORG. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/gb/decisions/GB317decision/WCMS_208157/lang--en/index.htm.
42. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE
TRIPARTITE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FORCED LABOUR AND TRAFFICKING FOR LABOUR
EXPLOITATION ¶¶ 92–102 (2013), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed
_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_207218.pdf.
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economies had only 113,000 victims of forced labor. Similarly, one million of
these victims of forced labor were trafficked into it, of which 408,968 were
trafficked in the Asia-Pacific region and 74,113 in the industrialized economies.
Let us consider another form of exploitation covered by Article 3 of the U.N.
Protocol, namely, practices similar to slavery, which include debt bondage. Here,
roughly 84 to 88% of the world’s 20.5 million bonded laborers are to be found in
South Asia.43
Further, although trafficking is usually thought of as a cross-border
phenomenon, in emerging economies such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia,
much of the trafficking is domestic. Thus, reportedly 90% of all trafficking in
India is domestic.44 Indeed, it is the very visibility of long-standing labor problems
in the context of the ratification and enforcement of the U.N. Protocol that has
caused these emerging economies to adopt particularistic interpretations of
trafficking in their criminal law as trafficking for sex work rather than for labor
exploitation.45 Notwithstanding such a reaction, to the extent that internal
migration, and therefore trafficking, has traditionally been a major problem to
which countries like India have responded, domestic legal responses to trafficking
could well inform the ongoing operationalization of the U.N. Protocol. Domestic
anti-trafficking law may also prove instructive in rethinking the enforcement
mechanism for anti-trafficking law, with a predominant role for labor law over
criminal law in targeting what is essentially a labor migration issue. In the intensely
transnational setting of anti-trafficking law, this “feedback loop” from the
domestic back to the international could well provide valuable insights.
In the rest of Part I, I will elaborate on the conceptual conundrums of the
definition of trafficking in Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol. To the extent that much
contemporary anti-trafficking law and its underlying discourse both produce and
are in turn constituted by the global sex panic, the quest for an alternate legal
imagination takes me to a domestic legal jurisdiction operating in “ordinary
times.” With the understanding that trafficking as a social problem has long predated recent international law reform efforts, in Part II, I locate my critique in
India, focusing particularly on the interlude between two moments of intense
legislative activity around trafficking for sex work in the 1920s and in the past
decade. Specifically, I examine how three social legislations of the 1970s, as
interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court in the 1980s, targeted social practices of
forced migration and labor, which we would today construe as trafficking. By

43. SIDDHARTH KARA, BONDED LABOR TACKLING THE SYSTEM OF SLAVERY IN SOUTH
ASIA 3 (2012).
44. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 184 (2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192595.pdf (third of seven PDFs comprising the
report; all other PDFs available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm).
45. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 120. Interestingly, trafficking is defined in
these jurisdictions as referring to trafficking only for sexual exploitation rather than labor exploitation.
For my discussion of the Indian context, see infra Part II.
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delineating how these laws construed concepts central to the trafficking debates—
namely, coercion, consent, and exploitation—in the context of the trafficking of
men for labor, I de-exceptionalize trafficking as always implying trafficking for sex
work. I then extend my discussion to exploitation, which is central to the alternate
legal imaginary as well as to the U.N. Protocol. I de-exceptionalize the
understanding amongst abolitionists of all sex work as amounting to trafficking by
theorizing exploitation in the context of the political economy of sex work in
India. Thus, I view the agency of third world sex workers as embedded in
concrete institutional structures by delineating the variances in levels of
exploitation within the sex industry.
I note here the tremendous disconnect between legal scholarship on human
trafficking on the one hand, and labor and migration studies on the other. Labor
and migration scholars continually delineate patterns of exploitation in labor
markets barely ever using the term trafficking. Legal scholars, meanwhile, are keen
to identify discrete instances of trafficking, but are somewhat frustrated with the
unwillingness of labor scholars to draw relatively clear boundaries between
trafficking and just “bad work,” which is amplified by the latter’s metaphorical use
of the term exploitation. Legal ethnographers, I suggest, are well equipped to
bridge this gap given their constant engagement with legal concepts used by
lawyers, their empirical lives, and the translation back into renewed conceptual
understandings. In the process, the interface between the law and economy is also
revealed, especially the precise interaction between social norms driven by the
economic logic of the market and the criminal law such that it becomes possible
to predict the counterintuitive economic consequences of anti-trafficking
regulatory options.
Finally, having examined labor law’s alternate regulatory framework for
dealing with trafficking, I switch gears to contemplate the chronic enforcement
gap that it entails. The enforcement of anti-trafficking law is impeded by problems
of misrecognition of survivors of trafficking and competing prerogatives (e.g.,
between trafficking and border control). In developing countries, poor
institutional resources pose an additional problem. Hence, I examine communitybased attempts to address trafficking. This involves sex workers, a constituency
mostly invisible, but also occasionally villainized, in anti-trafficking discourse.
Based on my advocacy work for an Indian sex workers’ organization in Kolkata
over the past several years as well as field work in the city’s biggest red-light area, I
examine the role of sex workers themselves in combating trafficking through the
constitution of self-regulatory boards. While this community-based initiative is
unique given the highly spatialized concentration of brothels in red-light areas like
Sonagachi, it generally points to the need for the active involvement of workers
themselves in addressing trafficking within their respective labor markets.
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B. Ten Years of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol—The Prevailing Common Sense
(Or the Unfolding of Collateral and Intended 46 Damage)
1. The Conceptual Scaffolding of Anti-Trafficking Law
In this section, I will highlight some conceptual dynamics that animate antitrafficking law and discourse so as to assess their interrelation and real-life effects.
In particular, I will explore the dynamics between coercion/consent,
legality/illegality, and exploitation. For this, consider the conceptual bare bones of
the definition of trafficking in the U.N. Protocol. We can, for ease of use,
disaggregate the definition in terms of the mode of or action required for trafficking
(recruitment, transportation, transfer etc.), the means by which it is obtained (threat
or use of force or other forms of coercion etc.) and the purpose for which it is
obtained, namely, exploitation. In the case of people aged eighteen and over, all
three elements must be involved for a case to be considered one of trafficking.47
The definition of trafficking in the U.N. Protocol reads as follows:
Art. 3. (a): “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b): The consent of a victim
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means
set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used.48
The issue of consent was central to the negotiations of the U.N. Protocol, and
was extraordinarily influenced by the sex work debates.49 The radical feminist,
abolitionist camp wanted prostitution listed as an end purpose for which
recruitment or transportation would automatically amount to trafficking even if it
was with the woman’s consent. In other words, they demanded that the purpose
for which the means are used result in a finding of trafficking, irrespective of the

46. At least one feminist lawyer who was a key player in the negotiations of the U.N. Protocol
mentioned how what had appeared to be collateral damage now appears to be “intended” on the part
of states that use anti-trafficking initiatives as a means to control migration and sex work.
47. Mike Dottridge, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, Introduction to
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AROUND THE WORLD 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.gaatw.org/Collateral%20Damage_Final
/singlefile_CollateralDamagefinal.pdf; Gallagher, supra note 38, at 987.
48. U.N. GAOR, supra note 13, at 61.
49. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1672–77.
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consent of the victim. “‘Individualist’ NGOs”50 on the other hand, wanted to
carve out the possibility of migrant voluntary sex work by decoupling the means
of recruitment from the end purpose. The compromise position indeed achieved
this decoupling with the caveat that the existence of one or more of the stated
means, such as coercion and deception, operated to render consent to exploitation
irrelevant.51 When it came to negotiations of the definition of the purpose,
namely, exploitation, prostitution was once again ambiguously listed as “exploitation
of the prostitution of others.”52 Yet the travaux préparatoires,53 or preparatory notes,
to the Protocol made it clear that this inclusion did not compromise states’
domestic, legal treatment of prostitution.54 Leaving aside the particularities of the
sex work debates and stepping back to observe the Protocol’s definition of
trafficking in its most general terms, we find that all three elements of the
definition, the “actions,” the “means,” and the “purpose,” are relatively broad and
open-ended.
2. Coercion, Consent, Abuse of Position of Vulnerability
Consider the means element in particular, namely, the “threat or use of force
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.”55
All the means other than the abuse of position of vulnerability appear to be
relatively bounded concepts defined with some precision in domestic legal
systems. Even then, there is “a high level of fluidity between the various ‘means’
stipulated in national laws, due, at least in part, to the absence of definitions” in
the U.N. Protocol itself.56
The term “abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” is rather broad,
which although not defined in the Protocol itself, according to the travaux

50. Halley et al., supra note 5, at 350.
51. One might of course argue that Explanation II is redundant since forms of exploitation
such as slavery, forced labor, servitude and so on negate consent. However “sexual exploitation” or
“the exploitation of the prostitution of others” do not necessarily imply the lack of consent. See U.N.
GAOR, supra note 13, at 61.
52. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Revised Draft Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.254/4/Add.3/Rev.7 (Jul. 19, 2000).
53. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh Session—Addendum:
Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (Travaux Préparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, U.N. Doc.
A/55/383/Add.1. (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime].
54. Id. ¶ 64.
55. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 5 n.1.
56. Id. at 8.
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préparatoires,57 it refers to “any situation in which the person involved has no real
and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”58 In a world
economy that is rife with precarious labor, this formulation offers little practical
direction. Even otherwise, some legal practitioners find the concept “too vague to
be effectively justiciable.”59 Recently, the ILO in an attempt to identify working
conditions that violate the ILO Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) drew the
line around this concept more narrowly. The ILO’s 2009 Report, The Cost of
Coercion, illustrates the concept by offering the example of a worker who is
economically so vulnerable that unless he complies with his employer’s demands,
he is at risk of losing his job.60
The Secretariat to the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons61 recently
prepared a background paper analyzing how this term has been operationalized. A
general overview of the sources they consider offers a traditional understanding of
vulnerability as related to one’s status arising from age, gender, pregnancy,
disability, and only occasionally economic condition.62 This was followed by a
rather detailed Issue Paper on Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and Other “Means”
Within the Definition of Trafficking in Persons, considered by the UNODC Expert
Group Meeting in June 2012. Significantly, the issue paper found that many states
construed “abuse of power or a position of vulnerability” in terms of a common
sense understanding of vulnerability. This permeated notions of disposition to
trafficking (rather than as a means of trafficking) and was also used to substantiate
other means of trafficking as well as the purpose of trafficking, namely,
exploitation.63 The concept was invoked both at the point of substantively proving
the offence of trafficking and also as a factor in determining penalties for
trafficking. In all these instances, vulnerability was understood in terms of
biological attributes (e.g., age, sex, disability), circumstances (e.g., isolation,
dependency, irregular legal status) or poor economic status. Interestingly, the
concept seems to have been added to the U.N. Protocol at the last minute, in an
attempt to resolve differences over how prostitution ought to be dealt with by the

57. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, supra note 53, ¶ 63.
58. Id. ¶ 63.
59. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 9.
60. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORG., THE COST OF COERCION:
GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK ¶ 35 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups
/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_106230.pdf.
61. Secretariat to the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Analysis of Key Concepts:
Focus on the Concept of “Abuse of Power or of a Position of Vulnerability” in Article 3 of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc. CTOC/COP/WG.4/2011/3 (Aug. 4, 2011).
62. See id. ¶¶ 14–34.
63. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 8.
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U.N. Protocol.64 Indeed, the Swiss courts have interpreted voluntary sex work by
foreign migrant women as necessarily devoid of consent given their presumed
vulnerability.65 The ideological differences between abolitionist feminists and sex
work advocates have clearly left a lasting legacy. To add to existing complexities,
states also interpret the relation between the means in the U.N. Protocol in rather
varied ways. Sometimes, the abuse of position of vulnerability is juxtaposed to the
other means of trafficking as involving subtle manipulation rather than force. At
other times, it is viewed as indicative of coercion, and yet on other occasions, as
equivalent to coercion.66
3. Exploitation
Similarly, let us consider the purpose of trafficking under the U.N. Protocol,
namely, exploitation, which received a lot less attention in the Protocol
negotiations when compared to the means. The U.N. Protocol defines exploitation
to include the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude, or the removal of organs. It is thus not an exhaustive definition.67 None
of these listed terms connoting exploitation is defined in the U.N. Protocol. The
term “exploitation of the prostitution of others” is referred to in the 1949 U.N.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation
of the Prostitution of Others (1949 Convention).68 There is no definition of the
term “sexual exploitation” in international law, and it was left undefined in the
Protocol due to disagreement between countries on what it includes.69 Pointing to
the exceptionalist legal treatment of prostitution, Miller notes that only
prostitution is described as an activity as opposed to other listed forms of
exploitation where a threshold for exploitation is specified.70
There are definitions of the terms forced labor, slavery, practices similar to
slavery, and servitude under international law. The ILO Convention No. 29
concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (1930) defines forced labor as “all work

64. See id. at 22.
65. Id. at 67.
66. See id. at 36, 41.
67. A United Nations report in fact suggests that it is a minimalist definition allowing for
region-specific forms of trafficking to be included and lists such “other forms of trafficking” such as
begging, illegal adoptions, and forced marriages. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 35 (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/Trafficking_in_Persons_2012_web.pdf.
68. United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
69. Miller, supra note 19, at 32. Although the 2012 United Nations Global Report on Trafficking in
Persons does not define sexual exploitation, it encompasses “obtaining economic profit from the
forced commercial sexual activity of another person: the exploitation of the prostitution of others.” It
also includes cases that may be defined as sex slavery, although Member States have reported very few
such cases. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 34.
70. See Miller, supra note 19, at 32.
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or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”71 Penalty is
interpreted as involving a legal or economic sanction, or the application of
physical or psychological force.72 The ILO specifically clarifies that forced labor
cannot be equated with low wages or poor working conditions, or situations of
pure economic necessity where a worker feels “unable to leave a job because of
the real or perceived absence of employment alternatives.”73 The ILO has been
recently engaged in revisiting the forced labor Convention to assess the need for
additional standard setting. After all, the Convention was adopted at a time when
governments were the principal users of forced labor,74 while 90% of forced
laborers are today exploited by private actors. In this context, the tripartite group
of experts who looked into the Convention in detail themselves disagreed on the
scope of forced labor in relation to trafficking. The Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, the supervisory body
entrusted with technical supervision of the application of the ILO Conventions,
viewed forced labor as encompassing trafficking.75 Others proposed that both
concepts were not identical, but shared some areas of overlap.76 The U.N.
Protocol itself conceptualizes trafficking as covering a range of exploitative labor
forms of which forced labor is only one form. As this Article goes to print,
standard setting on forced labor has been placed on the agenda of the 2014
International Labour Conference, rendering it a likely reform. Given that the
moral leadership of the ILO on an issue such as trafficking is at stake, clarifying
the relationship between trafficking and forced labor will become essential as
many countries seek to conform their domestic legislation on trafficking to the
Protocol definition.
Meanwhile, Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention77 defines slavery as
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching
to the rights of ownership are exercised.”78 The travaux préparatoires to the
Convention reveal “that the phrase ‘slavery in all its forms’ was not intended to,
and does not operate to, expand the definition beyond those practices involving
the demonstrable exercise of powers attached to the right of ownership.”79 Thus,
states explicitly rejected attempts to expand the notion of slavery to what they

71. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 25.
72. See id. ¶ 24–25, 27.
73. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST FORCED LABOUR ¶ 13 (2005),
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/
publication/wcms_081882.pdf.
74. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 17.
75. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 57.
76. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 51.
77. Slavery Convention art. 1, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
78. Id. at 263.
79. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 800–01.
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considered to be lesser forms of severe exploitation such as servitude.80 The
conceptual distinctness of slavery is also evident in international human rights law
and international criminal law.81 The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the
Elaboration of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery82 distinguishes between slavery and slavery-like practices such as debt
bondage,83 serfdom, servile forms of marriage, and the exploitation of children.
Interestingly, in a recent representation to the ILO, the UNODC viewed bonded
labor as being outside the ambit of the Article 3 definition of trafficking.84 Finally,
servitude is separate and broader than slavery. Although the final version of the
Protocol does not define servitude, the seventh revised draft of the Protocol85
defines it as “the condition of a person who is unlawfully compelled or coerced by
another to render any service to the same person or to others and who has no
reasonable alternative but to perform the service, and shall include domestic
service and debt bondage.”86
4. The Interplay Between Coercion and Exploitation
In a nutshell, the U.N. Protocol offers an expansive understanding of both
the means of trafficking as well as the purpose for which one is trafficked, namely,
exploitation. Despite the centrality of the concepts of coercion and exploitation to
the U.N. Protocol, the U.N. Protocol does not define them and their meaning
under international law is far from definitive even when clear. Indeed, even
according to the ILO, discussions amongst jurists and lawmakers on the
definitional aspects of trafficking continue without clear resolution.87 A survey of
the laws relating to trafficking in twelve jurisdictions found a widespread lack of
clarity around the definition of trafficking.88 The UNODC further admits that the
lack of clarity over the parameters of trafficking hinders detection of trafficked
victims and overall enforcement efforts.89 Each of these two central legal concepts
80. Id. at 801.
81. See id. at 802–03, 805–08.
82. United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18.3 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 41–
43.
83. The Supplementary Convention defines debt bondage as “the status or condition arising
from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security
for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation
of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.” Id. art.
1(a).
84. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 42, ¶ 23.
85. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, supra note 53.
86. Id. art. 2 bis(c). Chuang notes that servitude refers to the concept of servile status found in
the Supplementary Slavery Convention and thus would include debt bondage, servile marriage, and
trafficking in children. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1708 n.215.
87. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶¶ 17.
88. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 5.
89. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 89.
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in the law of trafficking, namely, the means and purpose, both span a continuum
of possibilities. The means of coercion can range from legally recognizable and
fairly narrowly construed notions of coercion, deception, fraud, and abduction
(termed as “strong coercion” for ease of reference90) to the capacious, outlier
concept of the abuse of a position of vulnerability (weak coercion). Similarly, while
Article 3 points to specific labor conditions that constitute exploitation and are
recognized and understood under international law (strong exploitation), this list
of labor conditions is not exhaustive and could well include a range of working
conditions that are best described as precarious, exploitative, and normatively
reprehensible (weak exploitation).
A narrow construction of the offence of trafficking might entail means of
entry such as coercion understood in terms of violence, deception or fraud (strong
coercion) resulting in slavery (strong exploitation). A paradigmatic example would
be the trafficking episode etched in our minds through repeated iterations by the
media, namely, of the young woman who is offered a well-paying job as a nanny
but is duped into doing sex work in a foreign country against her will and under
threat of physical and sexual violence for no pay. In contrast, a broader
construction of the offence of trafficking may penalize the recruitment of a victim
by abuse of the position of vulnerability (weak coercion) resulting in precarious
work with less than minimum-wage pay (weak exploitation). An example would be
of a Netherlands case where anti-trafficking law was invoked against a restaurant
owner who employed undocumented migrant workers (who begged him for a job)
working for far less than the Dutch minimum wage.91 This incredible malleability
of the definition of trafficking, although frustrating for lawyers, also suggests the
ability of states to tailor the offence according to their need and political, ethical,
and normative desire.
The offence of trafficking (at least in adults) requires both the means and
exploitative purpose to be proved although states are known to dispense with the
one or the other.92 As countries increasingly ratify the U.N. Protocol, their
domestic legal mediations of the coercion-exploitation balance vary quite
dramatically. Some countries are focused on coercive entry into labor markets
(United States), others on degrading conditions (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany),
with countries like Brazil targeting both.93 States that dispense with the means
element rather than the purpose element may assume that an exploitative labor
form must necessarily involve some form of coercion. Where means are dispensed
with, the scope of anti-trafficking law depends on the interpretive breadth of the

90. The terms “strong” and “weak” are not used to qualify the quality or quantity of the
means of trafficking but simply to indicate the levels of relative legal certainty or legal malleability
around them.
91. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 38–39.
92. See id. at 5, 48–55.
93. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶¶ 118–20.
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term “exploitation.”94 However, there is no necessary correlation between a
coercive means of entry and an exploitative purpose.95 In other words, coerced
entry into a labor sector can exist without exploitation, while exploitation can
occur without coerced entry. To illustrate, a domestic worker entering the United
Kingdom legally could well be paid far less than the minimum wage in a
household that she works in and thus be exploited. A female migrant duped into
sex work on the other hand, may well earn a lot more than she would have ever
earned in her previous employment and therefore not be exploited; exploitation
being understood here in purely economic terms.96
Some states may grade offences along a continuum with slavery at one end
and exploitation at the other, and with forced labor somewhere in between.97
Where states incorporate both the means and purpose into their definition of
trafficking, they may still dispense with certain elements of the means. In all of
these instances, apart from the ambiguity of the legal concept at hand, the criminal
law jurisprudence of the state can have a significant impact on the breadth of the
anti-trafficking offence. Crimes typically require both the conduct element (actus
reus) and the mental element (mens rea) to be satisfied. The mens rea element for
the offence of trafficking can purportedly range from ulterior intent (the strongest
version of the mens rea of intention), recklessness (knowingly taking an
unjustifiable risk), and negligence (failure to discharge a duty) to mere
knowledge.98 It is not clear whether the standard of mens rea varies according to
the means of entry, yet they are highly likely to correspond. Hence, the culpability
required for a means of trafficking through fraud or deception is likely to be
greater than that required for an abuse of position of vulnerability, where being
reckless as to the possibility of a person being exploited may suffice. These
doctrinal legal implications of anti-trafficking law have received little academic
attention, although some scholars have justified imposing strict liability on
purchasers of sex on the grounds of criminal law ideas of complicity and
endangerment.99
In assessing the architecture of anti-trafficking law, the ILO’s Operational
Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings are instructive.100 These are merely

94. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 51, 54–55.
95. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Trafficking, Smuggling, and Human Rights, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE
(Mar. 2005), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=294.
96. For my discussion on theorizing exploitation, see infra Part II.D.
97. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 118–20.
98. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 20 n.24, 86.
99. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1756–57 (2010). For a different view, see David Archard,
Criminalising the Use of Trafficked Prostitutes: Some Philosophical Issues, in DEMANDING SEX: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION 149, 156–59 (Vanesse E. Munro & Marina
Della Giusta eds., 2008).
100. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: RESULTS FROM A DELPHI SURVEY IMPLEMENTED BY THE ILO
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indicators to help collect data and assist practitioners and labor inspectors in
identifying incidents of trafficking and do not set out substantive legal
requirements. Yet, they elaborate in great detail the myriad aspects of trafficking
and offer a window into the factors that a state might consider in fashioning an
offence of trafficking. The ILO delineates four sets of indicators for adults and
children who are victims in sex work or in other forms of labor exploitation. Each
victim must cumulatively satisfy six dimensions of the trafficking definition
measured through the presence of two strong indicators, three medium indicators,
or a combination of strong, medium, and weak indicators for each of the
dimensions. The six dimensions include recruitment by deception, coercion and
abuse of vulnerability, exploitative work, and coercion and abuse of vulnerability
at the destination. These criteria clearly exceed the formal legal requirements of
the definition of trafficking under the U.N. Protocol, which requires only one of
the several means of trafficking to be present along with exploitation with no
reference to coercion or abuse of vulnerability at the destination.101 Further still,
the ILO Indicators treat trafficking for sex work differentially from trafficking for
other labor so that the presence of certain medium level indicators in labor
trafficking would constitute strong indicators when present in the context of
trafficking for sex work. The general effect of this elaboration is to delineate a
small category of trafficked victims who are deceived, exploited, and coerced, as
distinct from (a) successful migrants, (b) exploited migrants who are not deceived
or coerced, and (c) victims who are deceived and exploited but not coerced (at the
point of recruitment and destination). The ILO thus places a premium on being
coerced so a migrant could be exploited, but in order to be trafficked, coercion is
required. Interestingly, a review of the indicators suggests that coercion is
indicated predominantly by force, threat, and violence. This predilection towards
coercion rather than exploitation is mirrored in domestic legal regimes such as the
VTVPA.102 While some commentators attribute the narrow formulation of the
means of entry within the VTVPA to “force, fraud, or coercion” to the need for
the law to pass constitutional muster given the vagueness of terms such as the

AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public
/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_105023.pdf.
101. For a similar critique of the ILO Indicators, see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS
& CRIME, supra note 33, at 26.
102. See Section 8 of the VTVPA’s definitions, which defines severe forms of trafficking as
requiring force, fraud or coercion into the exploitative forms of labor listed therein. Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464, 1474
(2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)). This limited interpretation of coercion is particularly seen
in the process of identifying victims of trafficking. Given the priority of the UK government to crack
down on illegal migration, NGOs have pointed to how the UK Border Agency is permeated with a
culture of disbelief where officials are less likely to believe that persons with illegal or irregular
immigration status are credible. In these circumstances, victims who can prove their coercion are
privileged over those who cannot. See Juliane Heider, Un-Defining “Trafficking”: A Proposal to ReAlign Migration, Labour and “Exploitation” 12 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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abuse of position of vulnerability,103 others argue that this is a deliberate way to
discourage unlawful migration. In other words, the U.S. government prefers to
treat smuggled migrants subject to exploitation as ineligible for the protections
available to trafficked victims who have entered the country by means of force,
fraud, or coercion.104
Based on this analysis, we could conceptualize anti-trafficking law in terms of
a pyramid of trafficking offences with trafficking episodes involving strong
coercion and strong exploitation forming a narrow sliver at the top of the
pyramid, while the base is occupied by instances characterized by weak coercion in
relation to the means and weak exploitation in relation to the purpose.105 In the
context of transnational labor markets, intermediate categories of trafficking might
include scenarios characterized by strong coercion (e.g., deception into a certain
line of work) and weak exploitation (e.g., pay below minimum wage) and weak
coercion (e.g., abuse of position of vulnerability) and strong exploitation (e.g., debt
bondage). There are two additional dimensions along which anti-trafficking law
operates. The first is the legality of the means of entry, and the second is the
legality of the sector in which trafficked labor is carried out. One can thus
visualize at least sixteen scenarios based on these four factors that would implicate
anti-trafficking law, only a minute fraction of which anti-trafficking law targets in
reality.
Further, over the life of a trafficking episode, there is considerable fluidity
between statuses. A migrant may start out by migrating legally, but given the
complete lack of protection within the formal sector and high levels of abuse,
deploy the strategy of “absconding” to shift into an undocumented immigration
status. This is illustrated by the case of an Indian migrant worker in the United
Arab Emirates who enters the country legally to work in the construction industry,
is not paid his wages for five months, and suffers a work-related accident yet has
to continue working. Hence he “abscond[s].”106 Here the “structural violence”107
of the kefala system108 leads many migrants to work in the informal economy due
to workers’ inability to resolve work-related issues with their sponsor
employers.109 Alternatively, migrants could move from a lawful sector like
domestic work where levels of abuse are so high that migrant women prefer to

103. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 33, at 45.
104. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1635 (2010).
105. The clarity and certainty around a narrow definition of trafficking might result in a higher
rate of prosecution. Alternatively, a broader definition of trafficking might result in greater
prosecutorial discretion thus bringing down the rate of prosecution.
106. MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 94.
107. See id. at 95–97.
108. This is where the law of the host state requires migrant workers to be tied to their
employers such that they are prevented from switching employers. This system undermines migrants’
bargaining power and forces them to work and live in poor conditions.
109. See MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 130–34.
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resort to an illegal employment sector like sex work. This is true for both
undocumented migrants as well as those with legal status in the destination
state.110 Thus, we find Bangladeshi women and men who migrate to the Middle
East on a company visa to work as janitors, but are not informed about their
conditions of work, especially pay levels. They reach the host state and discover
that they can barely make ends meet on their meager salary, which is not paid on
time. Female migrants under tremendous pressure not to return home with an
empty hand then have no choice but to resort to sex work. Thus, 89.2% of
returnees who went on a company visa to do domestic work had to voluntarily
take up sex work.111 Mahdavi similarly writes of domestic workers in the United
Arab Emirates who routinely turn to sex work in search of increased autonomy
and higher wages,112 their reasoning being that “if we don’t have rights as maids or
prostitutes, then we might as well be prostitutes so we can make more money.”113
Viewed this way, it is not hard to understand why some states have focused
unduly on targeting prostitution through anti-trafficking law. Given the highly
stigmatized nature of sex work, it ticks the boxes of both coercion and
exploitation per se, the reasoning being that who but a coerced person would want
to do sex work, and how can sex work be anything other than exploitative? I will
elaborate on this particularistic interpretation of anti-trafficking law in the next
section. Yet it is not entirely certain that anti-trafficking law will always take
seriously instances of trafficking at the top of the pyramid of anti-trafficking
offences involving strong coercion and strong exploitation. The preoccupation of
many Western states with border control means that there is an inordinate
emphasis on the legality of the means of entry. The focus is on preventing those
migrating without proper documents while turning a blind eye to someone who is
crossing borders legally. Similarly, where the labor sector at the destination is
lawful under domestic law, states may turn a blind eye to exploitation. Thus, we
have a victim of trafficking recruited by means of strong coercion for purposes of
strong exploitation, but who falls off the radar screen of anti-trafficking law in the
host state. This is illustrated by the case of a migrant worker from the Philippines
who is recruited by deception to do factory work in the United Arab Emirates, but
finds himself illegally deployed to clean septic tanks on an American army base in
Iraq, which he is not allowed to leave.114
Migrants legally entering labor markets through the spectrum of strong or
weak means of coercion for varied levels of exploitation do not fare better either.
Thus, we find no legal protection for an Ethiopian migrant who believes she is
travelling to Dubai on a hotel maid visa, but is instead made to work in a hospital

110.
111.

See id. at 135.
THÉRÈSE BLANCHET, BEYOND BOUNDARIES: A CRITICAL LOOK AT WOMEN LABOUR
MIGRATION AND THE TRAFFICKING WITHIN 58 (2002).
112. MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 126.
113. Id. at 125.
114. See id. at 97–101.
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(strong coercion) under extremely poor conditions (weak exploitation).115
Conversely, Filipina hostesses in Tokyo’s nightlife industry enter into several
contracts with intermediaries in the Philippines in order to work in Japan on an
entertainer visa knowing fully well that some level of sexualized interaction is
essential (weak coercion). Several of these contracts give rise to debt bondage and
indentured labor (strong exploitation), but are rendered invisible through the
legitimating language of the written contract and the employment visa, which
makes migration possible. The buffer of Filipino managers and promotion
agencies meant to safeguard the interests of migrant workers in fact creates the
very conditions for the trafficking of these women whose sexualized work renders
them trafficked in the popular imagination, not the matrix of exploitative
contracts.116
5. Ambiguity, Conflation, and Diffusion: Mapping the Intended and Unintended Consequences
of Anti-Trafficking Law
In the previous section, I set out the conceptual scaffolding of antitrafficking law as exemplified by the U.N. Protocol. Confirming the highly
restrictive reach of anti-trafficking law is the preliminary assessment of its impact
by a range of nongovernmental actors almost ten years after the adoption of the
U.N. Protocol. Critics may rightly ask how we can definitively assess the impact of
the U.N. Protocol, much less the collateral damage117 that it has generated, given
the conceptual ambiguity at its heart and the lack of reliable data tracking the
phenomenon. Even for an international legal instrument that has been immensely
successful in terms of its ratification status,118 the operationalization of
international law into domestic legal norms can be a lengthy process spanning
several years.119 However, the preliminary assessment as to the impact of the U.N.
Protocol for sex workers,120 migrants121 and trafficked victims themselves122 is
115. See id. at 106–09.
116. Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Trafficked? Filipino Hostesses in Tokyo’s Nightlife Industry, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 168 (2006).
117. See Dottridge, supra note 47, at 20.
118. As of December 2013, 159 countries are party to the U.N. Protocol. INT’L LABOUR
OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 64. Moreover, within five years of the coming into force of the U.N.
Protocol, 63% of the 155 countries surveyed by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime in 2008 had
passed laws against major forms of trafficking. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra
note 10, at 8. Similarly, there have been an incredible number of action plans against trafficking unlike
against forced labor. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 90.
119. Indeed this was the case with the 1949 U.N. Convention. To illustrate, India was a
signatory to the Convention, but domestic law conforming to international legal obligations was not
passed by the Indian Parliament until 1956. See Ratna Kapur, India, in GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST
TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, supra note 47, at 114, 115–16.
120. Sixteen percent of the 155 countries surveyed by UNODC in 2009 had passed antitrafficking laws that were limited to sexual exploitation or covered only women and children. UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 8. According to the UNODC, the most
commonly identified form of human trafficking is sexual exploitation, although it admits that this
high percentage is likely to be a result of statistical bias of much of the data it relied on which came
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from European countries; these are more likely to detect victims compared to other regions. UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 11. In the 2009 Report, this was explained
in terms of the greater visibility of sexual exploitation when compared to exploitation in other labor
sectors. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 11. At the regional level, as
with the 2002 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Preventing
and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, trafficking was explicitly
identified with trafficking for sex work, while the definition of trafficking is based on the 1949 U.N.
Suppression of Traffic Convention, not the 2000 U.N. Protocol. South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and
Children for Prostitution, Jan. 5, 2002, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-traffiking.pdf. Even
in countries that have ratified the U.N. Protocol, law enforcement officials imply that entry into sex
work amounts to trafficking. See Dottridge, supra note 47, at 15. Interestingly, despite the focus on
prostitution itself, very little has been done to promote the human or labor rights of those who
prostitute. If anything, anti-prostitution funding restrictions effectuated by the Bush administration in
the name of combating sex trafficking undermined HIV prevention efforts amongst sex workers
when basic social services to certain sex worker populations were withdrawn. Chuang, supra note 17,
at 1713. Undocumented migrant brothel workers, for instance, have no protection under the VTVPA
because they have not been coerced or duped into sex work, even if they find themselves in slave-like
conditions. See April Rieger, Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex
Trafficking Victims in the United States, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 231, 249 (2007). Technically, these
women should also have the benefit of the law if their working conditions are poor, but the
prosecution officers are unlikely to make this nuanced distinction. See id. at 249–50. This can be
attributed to the underlying distinction between the good victim and bad prostitute, not unfamiliar to
lawyers in other areas of sexual violence. See Vanessa E. Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of
Degradation and Exploitation in the Context of Sex Trafficking, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 240, 243 (2008). Further
enhancing the distinction between deserving and undeserving victims is the fact that sex trafficking
victims are granted assistance in some countries only on the condition that they assist the prosecution
machinery. In the case of the VTVPA for instance, only victims of “severe” forms of trafficking are
eligible for benefits. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–
386, § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464, 1474 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012)). This involves a
cumbersome, long drawn-out certification program, which is inordinately tied to requirements to
assist in the trafficker’s prosecution. See Rieger, supra, at 247–52. Such distinctions have implications
for prostitution law reform in domestic legal jurisdictions as well. At the national level, the South
Korean statute, the Sex Trade Prevention Act, 2004, whose passage managed to place the country in
Tier 1 of the U.S. TIP Report, mandated that only victim sex workers were to be decriminalized and
not sex workers who worked voluntarily. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 44, at 210–11.
Abolitionists lay the blame for this on sex work advocates who they say insisted on “sex workers’
agency and the forced/free distinction,” which was deployed in domestic contexts to “promote a
conservative male sexual ethic.” KOTISWARAN, supra note 18, at 37 (citing SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE
INDUSTRIAL VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL SEX TRADE 206 (2009)).
“Similarly, in India a report commissioned by the National Human Rights Commission recommended
an interpretation of existing law to decriminalize soliciting by survivors of ‘commercial sexual
exploitation’ but not by victims who continued to do sex work.” Id. (citing SANKAR SEN & P. M.
NAIR, INST. OF SOC. SCIS., TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN INDIA 231 (2005)). Sadly,
where the U.N. Protocol encourages states to pursue demand reduction strategies under Article 9, it is
not unforeseeable for states to selectively apply this to the sex industry. The popularity of the Swedish
model criminalizing customers is testament to this. From then on, states could embark on a slippery
slope to also target the supply of sex workers.
121. From the time of the passage of the U.N. Protocol, border control is said to have been at
the heart of the Protocol as the very passage of the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime was motivated by sovereignty and security concerns rather than the human rights of migrant
and trafficked groups. Gallagher, supra note 38, at 994, 976; Halley et al., supra note 5, at 389;
Hathaway, supra note 24, at 6. The Protocol has prevented migration, including of those migrants who
cross borders illegally or earn money illicitly rather than addressing the various forms of exploitation
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sobering. The negative fallout of contemporary anti-trafficking law can be
attributed to the inherent ambiguity of legal concepts that are central to the U.N.
Protocol, the international upstaging of the U.N. Protocol by the VTVPA and its
annual TIP reports, and the special ideological status that sex work has enjoyed in
the anti-trafficking debates, which have detracted from a sophisticated
understanding of the interrelation between coercion and exploitation.
As has been well documented, much of the momentum relating to antitrafficking law emerged from the international reach of the U.S. domestic law, the
VTVPA, and its mechanism of the TIP Report released every year. What really
cemented the influence of the TIP reports is its normative condemnation of sex
work. A range of U.S. foreign policy initiatives unleashed by the Bush
administration detailed elsewhere further contributed to this impact.123
Significantly, the TIP reports have been known to conflate sex work and
trafficking from the very beginning while advancing the U.S. government’s
campaign against sex work internationally.124 The TIP reports have only delineated
sex work from trafficking since 2009.125 In the meantime, the TIP Report
mechanism has upstaged the U.N. Protocol such that the “performance of
governments with respect to trafficking is currently being assessed, not with
reference to the international rules that states (including the United States) have
collectively developed and freely accepted, but against criteria drawn up and
imposed by U.S. bureaucrats and politicians.”126 Due to the influence of the
VTVPA, the sex sector has been “the primary focus of most countries’ ‘anti-

listed in the U.N. Protocol or protecting the human rights of trafficked persons. Dottridge, supra note
47, at 1, 12, 15. The denial by both the U.N. Protocol and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol of the
complexity of real world migration scenarios means that developed countries have policed the line
between smuggling and trafficking vigilantly so that unlawful immigration is discouraged. Chacón,
supra note 104, at 1627. Meanwhile, the criminalization of smuggling also fosters trafficking,
Hathaway, supra note 24, at 5, at 34; see also Chacón, supra note 104, at 1640–41, and increases
exploitative conditions in destination countries while preventing refugees from exercising their rights
under international law. Hathaway, supra note 24, at 35–36; see also Satvinder S. Juss, Human Trafficking,
Asylum and the Problem of Protection, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MIGRATION LAW,
THEORY AND POLICY 281, 294 (Satvinder S. Juss ed., 2013). Thus, both countries of origin and of
transit Hathaway claims have been “effectively conscripted as agents of first world states of
destination,” Hathaway, supra note 24, at 27, so as to control migration at a minimal cost resulting in
significant damage to human rights concerns. Id. at 30. Perversely, trafficking has been invoked as the
driving force behind immigration enforcement thus putting a “human rights gloss on a borderenforcement model.” Chacón, supra note 104, at 1642. Similar rhetoric is seen emerging from the UK
government. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 5.
122. Less than two thousand people had availed themselves of the T visa since 2000 in the
United States. Chacón, supra note 104, at 1614. Thus, in the case of the United States, the VTVPA has
proved to be a law that is too narrow to reach a significant portion of the domestic trafficking
problem. Chacón, supra note 10, at 2987.
123. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1680–82.
124. Gallagher, supra note 31, at 386.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 382.
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trafficking’ efforts.”127 Hence, the efforts of human rights anti-trafficking NGOs
at the U.N. Protocol negotiations to decouple trafficking from prostitution and
thus shake off the legacy of the 1949 U.N. Convention have been far from
successful. Not only was trafficking being comprehended by states in terms of
trafficking for sex work, but sex work has also been conflated with trafficking.
There are indications that this trend may be becoming less strong.128 Thus,
the UNODC’s latest report on global trafficking suggests that more countries now
have comprehensive definitions of trafficking than before.129 The ILO points to
how trafficking for labor exploitation is receiving increased attention after an
initial focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation.130 Further, the definition of
trafficking in many countries covers trafficking for both labor and sexual
exploitation.131 That the critique of sex workers’ organizations against the
conflation of trafficking with sex work is gaining ground was evident most
recently in India. Here, in the context of rape law reform, a Presidential Ordinance
defined trafficking by conflating it with prostitution. This was so strongly
protested by sex workers’ groups that a Parliamentary statute replacing the
Ordinance modified the trafficking offence to define exploitation in terms of
physical and sexual exploitation instead of prostitution. Yet the moral charge that
prostitution produces means that it is likely to continue to have traction amongst
governments in their anti-trafficking policy. Indeed, the new trafficking offences
under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)132 also criminalize the use of a trafficked
person for sexual exploitation but not other forms of exploitation. Thus, the ILO
notes that prosecution rates for trafficking for labor exploitation continues to be
low, rather than for trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation.133
In conclusion, the discussion in Part I suggests that trafficking is a complex
international problem involving men and women implicated in varying degrees of
coercion and exploitation whose movement and conditions of work are further
legal or undocumented. Against this backdrop, domestic criminal law mechanisms
127. Julia O’Connell Davidson, Will the Real Sex Slave Please Stand Up?, FEMINIST REV., Aug.
2006, at 4, 11; see also Chuang, supra note 17, at 1657; Dottridge, supra note 47, at 12. This is
particularly true of the United States. See Chacón, supra note 104, at 1623 n.59 (pointing to the
overwhelming enforcement of trafficking for sex work rather than other labor sectors); Grace Chang
& Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the
Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 318, 320–28 (2007).
128. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 15.
129. The percentage of countries criminalizing only some aspects of trafficking decreased
from 17% in 2008 to 11% in 2012. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at
83.
130. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 120.
131. Id.
132. The Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 2013, No. 13 of 2013 (India), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/132013.pdf.
133. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 131. Similarly, the interpretation of certain
means of trafficking such as the abuse of position of vulnerability is likely to be influenced by whether
it is for purposes of sexual exploitation. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra
note 33, at 81.
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are an ineffective yet sharp instrument that includes and excludes legal subjects
arbitrarily. Given this situation, in the next Part, I offer a critique of antitrafficking law by delineating alternate legal imaginings of coercion and
exploitation and institutional mechanisms in order to target trafficking.
II. REORIENTING ANTI-TRAFFICKING DISCOURSE
A substantial amount of scholarship seeks to reorient contemporary antitrafficking discourse and overwhelmingly refers to issues of poverty, structural
adjustment policies, gender inequality, wide domestic socio-economic disparities,
transitional economies, immigration laws, and migration policies as factors that
influence trafficking. As Chuang observes, the current anti-trafficking discourse
has
embedded in the public consciousness a reductive narrative of
trafficking. . . . from a complex human rights problem rooted in the
failure of migration and labor frameworks to respond to globalizing
trends, to a moral problem and crime of sexual violence against women
and girls best addressed through an aggressive criminal justice
response.134
Thus, several scholars have put forth the migration frame for making sense
of trafficking,135 even suggesting that “the mainstream discourse on trafficking is
nothing more than a campaign to stop the international migration of women.”136
They have also highlighted the significance of the labor rights approach in
critiquing the current trajectory of anti-trafficking law.137 I both draw on and build
upon such research.
As I have demonstrated so far, the two significant drawbacks of antitrafficking legal discourse are as follows. Anti-trafficking discourse exceptionalizes
trafficking in terms of trafficking for sex work and sex work as an exceptional form
of female labor that must be cordoned off from other female labor markets and
eliminated through the use of prohibitionist criminal law. Here, I attempt to deexceptionalize both. Needless to say, the project of de-exceptionalizing trafficking
as being solely for sex work is better developed than the project of deexceptionalizing sex work. Many scholars have highlighted the vast range of labor
sectors into which workers are trafficked, labeling this “labor trafficking” in
contrast to “sex trafficking.” For some, the very term “sex trafficking” and its
134. Chuang, supra note 17, at 1694.
135. Jacqueline Berman, Biopolitical Management, Economic Calculation and “Trafficked Women,” 48
INT’L MIGRATION 85, 89 (2010).
136. Parreñas, supra note 116, at 147 (citing Laura M. Agustín, Challenging Place: Leaving Home
for Sex, 45 DEV. 110 (2002)).
137. See generally James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1849, 1871–74 (2010) (applying a “free labor” perspective to the problem of sex trafficking);
Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 105–19 (2012) (arguing
that a labor rights approach would provide more effective strategies to combat trafficking than the
human rights approach).
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privileged position as a major form of trafficking138 alongside “labor trafficking”
exceptionalizes the harm that those trafficked into sex work suffer from. Indeed,
the denial of sex work as a form of labor within which some trafficking occurs is
remarkable, suggesting the abolitionist subtext of the use of the term. Others have
argued that this distinction is misleading because labor trafficking is a gendered
phenomenon139 and is often accompanied by sexual abuse.140 While
acknowledging these feminist insights, for the time being, I will de-exceptionalize
trafficking by drawing on alternate legal imaginaries surrounding coerced
migration in ordinary times, as distinguished from moments of moral panic. Since
these responses were meant to deal with the trafficking of men for labor, they are
therefore drained of the abolitionist energy fostered by a global sex panic that
repeatedly puts anti-trafficking law at risk of misuse.
A. Domestic “Anti-Trafficking Law”: The Case of India
The contemporary legal regime on trafficking, especially the annual TIP
reports released by the U.S. State Department under the VTVPA and the various
antiprostitution policies of the erstwhile Bush administration141 have had an
enormous influence on the Indian state’s disposition towards regulating
trafficking. India figured in Tier 2 of the TIP report for the first three years
(2001,142 2002,143 and 2003144) of the TIP reporting before being placed on the
Tier Two Watch List between 2004145 and 2010.146 It was only in 2011 that India
was moved back to the normal Tier Two List.147 That year, India also ratified the
U.N. Protocol, which it had signed back in December 2002. Since 2006 however,
the Indian government, keen to be upgraded in the TIP rankings, attempted to
strengthen Indian anti-trafficking law in the form of a proposed amendment to
the Indian anti-sex work criminal law, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1986
(ITPA).148 The proposed amendment followed the Swedish model, where

138. Twenty-two percent of the world’s forced laborers are in forced sexual exploitation as
opposed to sixty-eight percent in forced labor exploitation according to the ILO. INT’L LABOUR
OFFICE, supra note 35, ¶ 2.
139. Melynda H. Barnhart, Sex and Slavery: An Analysis of Three Models of State Human Trafficking
Legislation, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 83, 93–94 (2009). However, Barnhart ultimately
recommends that trafficking for sex work and for other labor should not be bifurcated given that they
are interrelated systems of abuse and oppression; she calls for a single definition of human trafficking.
Id. at 131.
140. Id. at 91.
141. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1683–93; Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff:
Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 474–81 (2006); Halley
et al., supra note 5, 359–60.
142. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 12 (2001).
143. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 17 (2002).
144. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2003).
145. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 39 (2004).
146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 53 (2010).
147. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 52 (2011).
148. See Prabha Kotiswaran, Introduction to SEX WORK, at xi (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2011).
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authorities seek criminalization for the customers of trafficked sex workers. The
proposed amendment lapsed in Parliament in March 2009 due to governmental
dissonance, fostered largely by the countervailing influence of the public health
complex, which has for years undertaken HIV prevention work in sex worker
communities with international donor funding. The HIV prevention complex—
and indeed the Indian health ministry—viewed the proposed amendment to the
ITPA as significantly detrimental to these efforts, as it would have the effect of
driving the sex industry underground.149 However, the preliminary impulse of the
Indian state, like other states, was to offer a reactive response to the U.N.
Protocol by limiting trafficking to trafficking for sex work.150
That this impulse is a powerful one was evident once again in recent months.
In response to the gang rape and death of a twenty-three-year-old woman, the
President of India promulgated an ordinance on violence against women in
February 2013, which contained two provisions criminalizing trafficking and
employing a trafficked person.151 Although the ordinance substantially mirrored
the Article 3 definition of trafficking, it defined exploitation as including
prostitution, in effect conflating trafficking with sex work. As a result of the
forceful lobbying of the Law Ministry by Indian sex workers’ groups, the two antitrafficking provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2013, recently
passed by Parliament and signed into law as of April 3, 2013, sought to define
exploitation for purposes of the offence of trafficking as including any act of
physical exploitation and any form of sexual exploitation.152 In this circular
definition of trafficking, Section 370, which criminalizes trafficking, dropped one
of the means of trafficking listed under Article 3, namely, abuse of a position of
vulnerability. The litany of the forms of exploitation under Section 370 also
omitted reference to forced labor, the significance of which will emerge in my
discussion of the relevant case law. Recognizing the role of targeting the demand
for trafficked labor, Section 370A criminalizes anyone who engages a trafficked
minor or adult, but only for purposes of sexual exploitation. So sexual
exploitation, which is not defined in the Bill, continues to occupy a privileged

149.
150.

See id.
See Ratna Kapur, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, India, in
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 47, at 114, 128. The increased presence of the UNODC in India
has meant the setting up of anti-human trafficking units in certain states with the aim of targeting sex
work and rescuing victims of “commercial sexual exploitation.” See id. at 114–16. The National and
State Crime Records Bureaus, which have for decades produced annual reports on crime statistics,
introduced a new chapter on trafficking in 2006. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF
HOME AFFAIRS, CRIME IN INDIA 2006 (2006), available at http://ncrb.nic.in/ciiprevious/Data/CDCII2006/cii-2006/CHAP6star.pdf. Fantastic public service announcements showing policemen
placing large padlocks on brothels and Bollywood actors urging the populace to combat human
trafficking are not uncommon. See, e.g., ONE LIFE, NO PRICE (UNODC public service
announcement) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ggv5ZKQpww0.
151. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, No. 3 of 2013 (India).
152. See id.
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position over trafficking in the myriad labor sectors of the Indian economy,
including brick kilns, rice mills, farms, embroidery factories, mines, stone quarries,
homes, and carpet factories.
Historically speaking, Indian law has been attuned to the precarious labor
conditions of millions of Indians. The Indian Constitution, as a self-styled radical
legal document reflecting postcolonial aspirations for modern nationhood, is
concerned with indigenous forms of servitude. Under Part III of the Indian
Constitution dealing with fundamental rights, Article 23 prohibits the traffic in
human beings and begar153 and other similar forms of forced labor, making the
contravention of this provision an offence punishable in accordance with law.
Article 23 does not however define these terms. Several provisions of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), deal with aspects of trafficking such as kidnapping or
abduction (Sections 365, 367), procuring, buying and selling minors for
prostitution (Sections 366A, 366B, 372, 373), slavery (Section 371), and unlawful
compulsory labor (Section 374).154 Yet the Indian Penal Code does not define the
terms slavery, bondage, forced labor, or begary. Many of the labor-related
provisions in the IPC were a product of colonial law making. The exigencies of
colonial rule in general did not permit the framing of a comprehensive policy to
deal with forced labor in all its forms so that any policy or legislative changes were
purely reactive.155 Indeed, the state compulsorily acquired labor for public works,
the refusal of which was even visited by fine or imprisonment. It was thus left to
the postcolonial Indian state to address the social realities of bonded labor, forced
migration, and the deplorable conditions of migrant labor. These labor conditions
are recounted memorably in a short story written by the famous Bengali novelist,
Mahaswetha Devi, which is remarkably true to social reality. Over the decades,
Devi’s work has painted for us a very detailed picture of the condition of tribal
populations in postcolonial India. Although legible to the state through the
constitutional legal category of “scheduled tribes,” these tribal groups are severely
disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms, and are certainly absent from the popular
consciousness of the Indian public.
Devi’s The Fairytale of Rajbhasha is about a couple from the Kol tribe in the
present-day Indian state of Jharkhand who are recruited by Nandlal, a
moneylender to migrate to the prosperous farms of Punjab from their home

153. Indian courts find “begar” requires showing “that the person has been forced to work
against his will and without payment.” See Ram Khelwan Pathak v.. State Of U.P., (1998) 2 A.W.C.
1171 (India); see also KARA, supra note 43, at 284 n.12.
154. The Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA CODE §§ 365–74, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
155. See Michael R. Anderson, Work Construed: Ideological Origins of Labour Law in British India to
1918, in DALIT MOVEMENTS AND THE MEANINGS OF LABOUR IN INDIA 87, 119–20 (Peter Robb
ed., 1993). They either sought to undermine the competitive advantage of Indian industry, to meet the
labor needs of European employers or the colonial state, or were proposed (as with the abolition of
slavery) in response to the social reform preferences of the British middle classes. See id. at 101–03,
113–18.
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village. Sarjom, a bonded laborer working for free on Nandlal’s farm to pay off his
debt and Josmina, his wife, are promised a salary of four hundred rupees a month.
Nandlal entices Sarjom as follows:
An excellent job. Big farmers. Plenty to eat. Work for a short period. The
two of you will get, say, about four hundred a month. Enough clothes.
Work for a year and at the end of it—baap re baap [oh my]! You’ll come
back with almost five thousand bucks! Sit at home and enjoy!156
They accompany the moneylender little knowing that the plight that awaits
them is a familiar one experienced by thousands of migrant laborers and contract
workers travelling across the country. Sarjom and Josmina are sold for four
hundred rupees to a wealthy farmer who is willing to pay them only 120 rupees
(80 rupees for Sarjom and 40 for Josmina) for sixteen to 18 hours of work a day.
At the end of each day, they are kept under lock and key. Worse, the employer
repeatedly rapes Josmina. As they escape from him, forsaking their pay, they are
retrafficked from one farmer to the next, until a benevolent farmer, whose son
rapes Josmina, sends them back home with pay. Josmina discovers she is
pregnant, and fearing that her family will be ostracized, commits suicide. This is
the life story of Sarjom and Josmina, which Devi claims, like a fairy tale, has a
beginning but no end.
Sarjom and Josmina today would be considered victims of trafficking. After
all, they are recruited and transported by the abuse of position of vulnerability (at
the very least); if not for deception for the purpose of exploitation, including
servitude and, in the case of Josmina, sexual exploitation. This form of domestic
trafficking is comparable to cross-border trafficking in many respects. The tribals
consider themselves to be different from the non-tribals, or dikus, and this
includes Nandlal as well as the prosperous farmers of Punjab. Labor for the farms
in Punjab is routinely hired from the tribal belt through a contractor, also called a
Sardar, who subcontracts the job out to agents like Nandlal. The moneylender
typically approaches tribals every year in September before the harvest season
when they are on the verge of starvation and are therefore vulnerable to promises
of a well-paying job. These tribals travel far and do not speak the language of the
destination state, namely Hindi, and therefore experience their new environs as
foreign. With their movement being restricted, they are unable to communicate
with locals and hence unable to escape. Both local and migrant workers are paid
well below the minimum wage, and women are paid half of what male laborers are
paid. Yet, employers prefer migrant tribals to local workers as they are less
expensive despite which local workers are sympathetic to the migrants’ plight.
Often, as in the case of Sarjom, migrants are already bonded laborers, paying off
old debts by working for free. However, these laborers are not naïve victims.
When Nandlal for instance comes to Josmina’s house looking for Sarjom to

156. MAHASWETA DEVI, The Fairytale of Rajabasha, in OUTCAST: FOUR STORIES 57, 62
(Sarmistha Dutta Gupta trans., 2002).

384

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:353

propose migration to Punjab, she confronts him about his loan that they are
paying off. Made aware of the moneylender’s exploitative practices by a local
activist who is campaigning for the tribals’ right to the forest, Josmina asks the
moneylender if their debt has not been almost paid off. She taunts him for making
use of her husband’s labor for free, citing their debt to him as the only worry they
face in life. Mahaswetha Devi further offers an insight into the decision making of
the couple as they decide to migrate to Punjab. Even when Sarjom is enticed by
Nandlal’s offer to earn several thousand rupees and return home to a life of
luxury, Josmina is more discerning. She counsels him that the tribals have always
stuck it out before the harvest season and suggests that they discuss Nandlal’s
offer with the local activist. Several times during their stay in Punjab as well,
Josmina and Sarjom plot their escape from their employers, trying to demand their
dues ahead of time but with little success.
B. De-Exceptionalizing Trafficking; Revisiting the Means
It was precisely to deal with the labor conditions described by Devi that the
Indian Parliament passed three statutes in the 1970s. I suggest that Sections 370
and 370A of the IPC need to be read in conjunction with these three domestic
anti-trafficking laws.157 To keep true to the tone of the statutes and court decisions
that I consider, I will use the terms they employ rather than “trafficking,”
suggesting that they offer the possibility of an alternate legal imagination of
trafficking. Specifically, they are the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976,
as amended by the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1985
(BLSAA), the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, as amended
by the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Amendment Act No.14 of 1986
(CLRAA), and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act (Regulation of Employment
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (ISMWA). The BLSAA is a social legislation
aimed at abolishing intergenerational bondage158 backed up by the force of the

157. Cf. Kapur, supra note 150, at 128 (stating that Indian laws did not provide a
comprehensive approach to trafficking through the broader framework of migration). The need to
read these provisions in a complementary manner once again highlights the complexity of the
phenomenon of trafficking requiring intervention at varied scales from different areas of the law.
Note here the recommendation of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in
Persons:
[T]he Trafficking in Persons Protocol is not sufficient to ensure a comprehensive and
effective response to human trafficking. Instead, efforts must be made to ensure better
understanding of the coherence between human rights law, refugee law, labour law and
other relevant bodies of law, and the need to bring diverse but complementary instruments
to bear on the trafficking challenge . . . .
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION GROUP AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS CONCERNING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 14 (2012),
available at http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgehub/resource-centre/ICAT/ICAT_Policy_Paper
_1_The_International_Legal_Instruments.pdf.
158. The statement of objects and reasons to the legislation clearly indicates that it is aimed
towards the abolition of a system existent in many parts of the country where “several generations
work under bondage for the repayment of a small sum which had been taken by some remote
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criminal law, whereas the other two statutes fall within the province of labor law.
Together, they form an interlocking system consisting of both criminal and labor
laws aimed at targeting trafficking. I will detail the broad framework of each of
these statutes before examining their interpretation by the Indian courts.
The BLSAA essentially abolishes the “bonded labor system,” which is
defined as a system of forced/partly forced labor whereby a debtor enters, or is
presumed to have entered, into an agreement with a creditor under which, in
exchange for economic consideration, or in pursuance of any customary or social
obligation or obligation devolving upon him by succession or by reason of his
birth into any caste or community, he is required to work under certain
conditions. As such, bonded labor would amount to “a practice similar to slavery”
for purposes of Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol. Under the BLSAA, the terms
“forced labor” and “partly forced labor” are not defined but the working
conditions that they entail are listed under Section 2(g)(v). These include where
the debtor renders his own labor or that of his family without wages or with the
payment of nominal wages, gives up his freedom to sell his labor or the products
of his labor, gives up his right to sell his property and gives up his freedom to
move. “Nominal wages” are defined as a wage below the minimum wage or what
is normally paid for the same or similar labor in that locality. It thus incorporates
both the legal wage floor as well as the market wage floor. The term “agreement”
provides both for an agreement voluntarily entered into by the debtor with the
creditor but also presumes the existence of an agreement for forced labor under
any social custom prevailing in a locality. These customs are listed in the
legislation. Thus, the statute not only deals with bonded labor as a customary
practice facilitated by the caste system, but also with supposedly voluntary
agreements made under the force of circumstance whereby a debtor agrees to
extremely harsh and ordinarily unacceptable working conditions amounting to
forced labor. Note, however, that the movement or transportation of a laborer is
not essential for him or her to be considered bonded.
The broad ambit of the legislation as extending beyond customary
intergenerational bonded labor was reiterated by an amendment in 1985, which
declared that any contract laborer or interstate migrant laborer who performed
labor under the conditions listed in Section 2(g)(v) would be assumed to be
working under a bonded labor system, which ought to be abolished. Chapter II of
the BLSAA outlaws bonded labor and prohibits and penalizes both existing and
future bonded labor. All bonded laborers are set free and, by law, their obligation
to pay back the debt is extinguished. The Act has several elaborate deeming
provisions in relation to existing and future legal action arising from the debt.
These provisions give us some inkling for what a victim centered anti-trafficking

ancestor.” The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, No. 19 of 1976, INDIA CODE (1976), available
at http://www.childlineindia.org.in/CP-CR-Downloads/Bonded%20Labour%20System%20%28Abolition
%29%20Act%201976%20and%20Rules.pdf.
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law organized through the criminal justice system might look like. Creditors
accepting any repayment for an extinguished debt can face imprisonment and
fines. Offenses are cognizable and bailable, while civil courts have no jurisdiction
under the Act. Local district magistrates and subordinate officers have to ensure
the Act’s implementation, the eradication of bonded labor, and the rehabilitation
of bonded laborers so as to prevent their becoming bonded again. Vigilance
committees with representatives of the state, the affected community, social
workers, rural development institutions, and credit institutions are to assist the
executive in this, while also defending suits against freed bonded laborers. Where
the committee or laborer asserts the existence of a debt, bonded labor is presumed
and the creditor has to prove otherwise.
The next two statutes that I discuss, the CLRAA and the ISMWA, deal with
contract labor and migrant labor respectively. One could map all three labor forms
along a choice-coercion spectrum, with bonded labor at one end, ostensibly “free”
labor at the other with contract labor and migrant labor falling somewhere in
between. Indeed, the interpretive materials surrounding the laws do not draw out
differences between these labor forms too sharply. Especially salient is the role of
intermediaries in all three labor forms confirming the insights of Indian historians
that in the Indian context, “the key opposition is not clearly between capital and
labour; rather the line is once again blurred by the use of intermediaries.”159 The
influence of intermediaries has historically been evident even within the
supposedly formal labor sector, where laborers were recruited through caste or
village ties, managed by jobbers, subject to debt-bondage and paid only nominally
in cash, “thus in many ways replicating the features of agrestic servitude rather
than a labour market.”160 This persistent role of intermediaries may well explain
the pragmatic imposition of obligations on them rather than their criminalization
under the statutes I am about to consider.
The CLRAA originally passed in 1970 and amended in 1986 seeks to ensure
that formal sector employers do not evade their obligations to their regular
workforce by routinely employing contract laborers for short periods of time,
making them ineligible for benefits under labor laws.161 Although the legislation
targets labor practices in the formal sector, courts have very much viewed the
CLRAA as a social legislation for the welfare of laborers. Empirical studies of
contract labor further suggest high levels of informality with the largest proportion
of contract laborers working in the construction industry where contractors
themselves are small operators and are not conversant with the requirements of

159. Peter Robb, Introduction to DALIT MOVEMENTS AND THE MEANINGS OF LABOUR IN
INDIA, supra note 155, at 1, 17.
160. Id. at 61.
161. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, No. 37 of 1970, INDIA CODE
(1986).
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the CLRAA.162 The government can, under the CLRAA, prohibit contract labor
by assessing the working conditions of contract laborers, their indispensability,
and whether regular workmen cannot take their place in the production process.
Where abolition is warranted, a contract laborer becomes a regular employee.163
Recognizing, however, that pending the abolition of contract labor, minimum
working conditions need to be ensured, the CLRAA imposes obligations on
recruiters of contract laborers and intermediaries in the employer-employee
relationship. Only registered principal employers and contractors can employ
contract labor. A contractor in turn could be a mere recruiter or subcontractor
rather than involved in the production process. Contractors are responsible for
ensuring proper working conditions (such as canteens, drinking water, latrines and
urinals, and first aid) with a backstop to the principal employer. They must
promptly pay full wages in the presence of the principal employer’s representative.
Central and state level advisory boards and inspectors enforce the law, which
penalizes offending parties. Despite these enforcement mechanisms, however, the
CLRAA has proved ineffective against recruiters.164
The statement of objects and reasons of the ISMWA notes that in several
Indian states, contractors or agents called sardars or khatadars recruited laborers for
out-of-state work in large construction projects. The worker was taken to a far-off
place on payment of railway fare only and worked seven days per week without
fixed hours under extremely poor conditions. Agents promised, but eventually
reneged on, the monthly settlement of piece-rate wages. Given the inadequacy of
the CLRAA to deal with such abuse, the ISMWA was passed to protect the
interests of this illiterate and unorganized migrant labor force.
The ISMWA applies to any establishment or contractor who employs five or
more interstate migrant workers (ISMW) and therefore covers even small
operations.165 A “contractor” could be an independent contractor, agent, or
employee, who undertakes to produce a given result for an establishment by
employing or supplying workmen, and includes a subcontractor, a sardar, or
khatadar. The Indian Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India held
that even workmen recruited through “old hands” would be ISMW as the “old
hands” were the recruiters’ agents.166 The ISMWA is similar to the CLRAA in
many respects. Both principal employers and contractors must be registered, the
latter needing to be registered with both home and host governments without
which they cannot employ an ISMW. The issuing authority can build into the
license conditions relating to the provision of appropriate wages, hours of work,

162. Bagaram Tulpule, ILO Initiative on Contract Labour, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Aug. 30, 1997,
at L-21, L-22.
163. Sec’y, Haryana State Elec. Bd. v. Suresh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1160, 1165–66 (India).
164. Tulpule, supra note 162, at L-22.
165. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of
Service) Act, 1979, No. 30 of 1979, INDIA CODE.
166. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 67 (India).
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and essential amenities. Contractors are required to issue to the ISMW a passbook
with a photo and contractual terms in a language that he understands. Contractors
are required to pay minimum wages on time and in the presence of the principal
employer’s representative. ISMW are also entitled to a displacement and roundtrip journey allowance, suitable conditions of work, housing, medical facilities, and
protective clothing as well as the labor law protections of the host state. Where
these requisite payments are not made or facilities not provided under the
ISMWA, the principal employer is liable for these. Upon the job’s completion, the
contractor must issue a statement that all wages and money for the return journey
have been paid. No loan to the worker is to be outstanding or else it will now be
extinguished. Inspectors are appointed to enforce the ISMWA, but workers can
submit disputes to their home states to be passed on to an authority appointed
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The Indian Supreme Court interpreted the three legislations in landmark
judgments issued by activist judges at the height of the public interest litigation
movement of the 1980s. In at least two of the cases, the state undertook largescale projects, which were operationalized by private party contractors who, in
turn, employed subcontractors to recruit workers for these projects. In PUDR v.
Union of India,167 also referred to as the Asiad Games case, the government was
engaged in numerous construction projects in preparation for hosting the Games
in 1982. They hired contractors who in turn hired jamadars/subcontractors. These
subcontractors brought workers from other parts of the country and paid them
less than the minimum wage after deducting a commission for themselves from
the payment due to the workers. Their working conditions did not conform to the
requirements under labor laws either. Critical for our purposes is the elaboration
that the Supreme Court offered on Article 23 of the Constitution, which prohibits
“begar and other similar forms of forced labour.”168 Viewing bonded labor and
forced labor as a relic of a feudal, exploitative society that was exacerbated by two
centuries of foreign rule, Justice Bhagwati denounced them as “totally
incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order which ‘We the people
of India’ were determined to build . . . .”169
In the process of clarifying the parameters of force in the context of forced
labor, the Court specifically pointed to the low relevance of the freedom of
contract in a country like India:
[W]here there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no
equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on its face
voluntary but it may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering
into the contract, the employee, by reason of his economically helpless

167.
(India).
168.
169.

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473, 1473
INDIA CONST. art. 23.
People’s Union for Democratic Rights, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. at 1486.
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condition, may have been faced with Hobson’s choice, either to starve or
to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the powerful employer.170
Elaborating on what constituted force, Justice Bhagwati further observed:
‘[F]orced labour’ may arise in several ways. It may be physical force . . . or
it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for
imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or
service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty,
want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives
and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as
‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’, it would be ‘forced
labour’. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he
has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or
even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his
back. . . and where no other employment is available to alleviate the
rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work
that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than
the minimum wage. . . . And in doing so he would be acting not as a free
agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of
economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him
would be clearly ‘forced labour’. There is no reason why the word
‘forced’ should be read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be
confined only to physical or legal ‘force’. . . .171
Under the circumstances, the court held that any labor remunerated at a level
less than the minimum wage would be considered to be forced labor under Article
23 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the contractarian
argument was reinforced in another case involving the ISMWA,172 where the
federal government argued that the large number of migrant workmen who were
recruited by contractors to work on a major state-sponsored hydroelectric project
were not migrant workmen under the ISMWA because they had come to work
voluntarily. Further, in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the Supreme Court held
that given that it was likely for a forced laborer to have received an advance on his
earnings to live off, “whenever it is shown that a labourer is made to provide
forced labour, the Court would raise a presumption that he is required to do so in
consideration of an advance . . . and he is therefore a bonded labourer.”173 In
response to these Supreme Court decisions, the Indian Parliament passed an
amendment to the BLSAA in 1985 declaring that where any contract laborer or
ISMW worked in a system of forced labor under the conditions listed in Section
2(g)(v) (which includes being paid below the minimum wage), it would amount to
bonded labor.

170. Id. at 1489.
171. Id. at 1490 (emphasis added).
172. Labourers Working on Salal Hydroelectric Project v. Jammu and Kashmir, (1983) 2
S.C.C. 181, 186–88 (India).
173. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 78 (India).
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I consider the three Indian statutes detailed above as a version of domestic
anti-trafficking law. Interpretive materials surrounding the statutes describe
conditions in labor markets where laborers were routinely recruited and often
transported under false promises to distant places within the country for purposes
of work-related exploitation—in other words, trafficking. The term “trafficking” is
however not mentioned in these statutes, affirming the historical association of
the concept with prostitution. This iteration of anti-trafficking law is instructive
for the contemporary trafficking debates on several counts. First, it construes
force not merely in terms of physical and legal force but in structural terms, that
is, background economic conditions including of poverty, in other words, “weak
coercion.” The court also decisively denounced on normative grounds any labor
that is paid less than the minimum wage, targeting “weak exploitation” among
other things. Further, in line with the court’s cognizance of the rampant social
practice (affirmed by a fact-finding inquiry commissioned by the court) of the
payment of advances to vulnerable laborers, the Court presumed a relation of debt
bondage, unseating the common understanding of bonded labor as only involving
intergenerational bondage.
Legal relations under all three statutes are triggered by contractual
agreements between the contractor and laborers. This is true even of the BLSAA,
which provides both for customary intergenerational bonded labor where the
caste system effectively “traffics” laborers as well as for contractual arrangements
that result in bonded labor. The CLRAA and ISMWA make no mention of the
means of recruitment into exploitative working conditions, while the BLSAA lists
certain social customs as involving force per se. There is instead an assumption
that the means necessarily involve high levels of economic and social compulsion,
which is only reinforced by the Indian Supreme Court, whose conception of force
goes beyond physical and legal force to cover even background conditions of
poverty. Economic vulnerability, ignorance, and poverty all become indicators that
the recruitment for migration was indeed coerced. We find here an expression of
what Article 3(a) of the U.N. Protocol lists as the “abuse of a position of
vulnerability.” Recollect that the travaux préparatoires 174 defines this as “any
situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative but
to submit to the abuse involved.”175
The determinative factor then is whether the recruitment results in
exploitation. Section 2(g)(v) of the BLSAA sets an objective threshold for such
exploitation including the payment of anything less than the minimum wage.
Where working conditions are poor, irrespective of the means of recruitment,
intermediaries, namely the recruiters and contractors, are held liable for providing
appropriate pay and working conditions with a backstop to the primary employer.
174. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, supra note 53.
175. Gallagher, supra note 38, at 986 n.71 (citing Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 53, ¶ 63).
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Thus, instead of being bogged down by apparently bright-line concepts like force
and coercion, the BLSAA, CLRAA, and ISMWA concentrate on the labor
conditions that avail at the other end. Thus, the means of trafficking are
deemphasized and the purpose of trafficking, namely, exploitation, privileged.
Unlike the IPC’s new anti-trafficking provisions, the CLRAA and ISMWA seek to
ameliorate such working conditions by imposing obligations on the intermediaries,
especially the recruiters who supplied these laborers to the principal employers.
Apart from these interpretations of the means and purposes of trafficking, the
statutes that I have discussed also deploy a combination of criminal law and labor
law mechanisms to target trafficking instead of solely relying on criminal law,
which is a fraught option considering the abuse-generating role of the Indian
police.
C. Potential Objections to a Critique of Anti-Trafficking Law
Four objections are possible to my analysis of Indian anti-trafficking law.
These pertain to (a) the transportability of a domestic legal model to cross-border
trafficking; (b) the arguably unique nature of Indian labor conditions; (c) whether
an emphasis on exploitation might not further entrench a politics of abolition; and
(d) whether rendering visible the exploitation of men might not obscure the
specific harms that women suffer in the course of migration.
The first line of critique relates to whether obligations of the kind envisaged
by Indian labor laws could be easily imposed on intermediaries in the international
setting. The significance of intermediaries in cross-border migration suggests that
the Indian law on interstate migration can offer a viable model. Indeed, for
countries whose citizens migrate outwards in substantial numbers like the
Philippines or Sri Lanka, regulating intermediaries such as employment recruiters
under domestic law is a fairly standard legal strategy. States of origin also typically
require certification and skills training, the signing of written contracts, and
consular support in the host state. Indeed, even India passed the Emigration Act
in 1983, which prohibits the emigration of Indian citizens for work abroad unless
they obtain emigration clearance, which can be refused where the terms and
conditions of employment are discriminatory or exploitative, where working and
living conditions are substandard, or where the work is against Indian law, public
policy, or human dignity and decency. Recruiters and employers are sought to be
regulated. Drawing on the ISMWA, one might go further to hold intermediaries
liable for the employer’s obligations with a backstop to the employer. This might
include mandating employers in the host state to pay minimum wages. However,
protective measures can end up having perverse consequences in that the number
of jobs available in the host state might reduce as a result.176 More generally, as the

176. See DAVID MCKENZIE ET AL., DISTORTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT
LABOR MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM FILIPINO MIGRATION AND WAGE RESPONSES TO
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work of Rhacel Parreñas on Filipina migrant hostesses in Japan demonstrates, an
elaborate labyrinth of obligations imposed both in the Philippines and in Japan on
recruiters, agencies, and employers has only resulted in hostesses being
indentured. Her work also illustrates that these labor sectors are quite sensitive to
any regulatory changes. Thus, when the Japanese government introduced more
stringent requirements for entertainer visas,177 ostensibly to professionalize
hostessing by increasing the training period (but really to improve its Tier 2 Watch
List categorization in the TIP rankings), the numbers of Filipina migrant hostesses
fell from eighty thousand in 2004 to eight thousand in 2005.178 This translated into
more debt for the migrant workers, increasing their conditions of trafficking.179 If,
on the other hand, one were to reduce their qualifications to reduce debt levels
amongst Filipina hostesses through their reduced dependency on talent
managers,180 the resultant increased supply of hostesses may well lower wages in
the host state. Still, an assessment of such unintended consequences should not
dissuade us from improving the bargaining power of workers.
Some may object that Indian anti-trafficking law addresses the peculiar
conditions of Indian labor. This may explain the anecdotal reports from
negotiators of the U.N. Protocol of India’s resistance to anti-trafficking law given
national embarrassment over the problem of bonded labor. While these claims as
to the exceptionalism of Indian labor conditions continue to be the matter of
much debate amongst postcolonial scholars, the category of the free wage laborer
has unraveled in the West with significant transformations in the political
economy and the rise of the precariat,181 suggesting that the free wage laborer was
probably always somewhat of a mythical figure. Also, while intergenerational
bonded labor may appear unique to South Asia, recent sociologies of bonded
labor map the rise of neo-bondage involving seasonal migrant labor where entry is
not due to deception.182 Arranged through jobbers and contractors, laborers here
are tied in through loans/advances prior to the start of employment,183 are paid
minimal allowances during employment, with overall payment being settled at the
end, which may leave the laborer in debt, to be repaid through next year’s seasonal
work.
DESTINATION COUNTRY ECONOMIC SHOCKS 26 (2012), available at http://www.cream
-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_09_12.pdf.
177. Parreñas, supra note 116, at 172–73.
178. Id. at 147.
179. Id. at 173.
180. Id. at 177.
181. GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 27 (2011).
182. See, e.g., Jens Lerche, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, Neo-liberal
Globalization, and the International Labour Organization, in INDIA’S UNFREE WORKFORCE: OF BONDAGE
OLD AND NEW 352, 368 (Jan Breman et al. eds., 2009); see also INT’L LABOUR ORG., BURIED IN
BRICKS: A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF BONDED LABOUR IN BRICK KILNS IN AFGHANISTAN 34 (2011),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms
_172671.pdf (providing a similar analysis in another South Asian context); KARA, supra note 43, at 28.
183. Lerche, supra note 182, at 367.
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A more substantive objection to my analysis is that by rendering visible the
endemic nature of coercion, it opens itself up to an abolitionist agenda with its
favored solutions of rescue and rehabilitation. Indeed, MacKinnon inaugurated
the radical feminist project thirty years ago when she claimed, in the context of
rape, that where force and desire were not mutually exclusive, it was debatable
whether consent was a meaningful concept.184 Despite these beginnings, radical
feminists are today content with pursuing simplistic strategies of rescue and
rehabilitation in anti-trafficking initiatives. Notably, however, the Indian Supreme
Court has expressed ambivalence about the rehabilitation of bonded laborers. In
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,185 99% of the laborers found by an NGO
to be working in stone quarries in the state of Haryana were from various parts of
India. They were working under unsafe working conditions and living in
inhumane conditions without shelter, food, or clean drinking water. A large
number of them were bonded laborers. The court noted that where rehabilitation
was not forthcoming, improved conditions of labor might be preferable at the
current site of work. It observed:
We may point out that the problem of bonded labourers is a difficult
problem because unless, on being freed from bondage, they are provided
proper and adequate rehabilitation, it would not help to merely secure
their release. Rather in such cases it would be more in their interest to
ensure proper working conditions with full enjoyment of the benefits of
social welfare and labour laws so that they can live a healthy decent life.
But of course this would only be the next best substitute for release and
rehabilitation which must receive the highest priority.186
Even setting aside the lack of political commitment on the part of the Indian
state to eradicating bonded labor,187 bonded laborers themselves are known to
mock the rescue efforts of NGOs188 who erroneously assume that bondage was
imposed through “extra-economic coercion,” namely, trickery. Some laborers
prefer not to be released since they have no alternative.189 In countries like Nepal,
bonded laborers who had been freed often slipped back into debt bondage given
184. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635, 650 (1983).
185. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 67 (India).
186. Id. at 136.
187. KARA, supra note 43, at 39, 42 (stating that prosecutions are rare, and that rehabilitation is
virtually nonexistent or withheld for unreasonably long periods of time). Also, Kara gives reasons for
the lack of enforcement. Id. at 201. Furthermore, of the 231 prosecutions that were launched under
the BLSAA since 1996–1997, only six had been decided and even those cases had resulted in
acquittal. Id. at 205.
188. See Jan Breman & Isabelle Guérin, Introduction to INDIA’S UNFREE WORKFORCE: OF
BONDAGE OLD AND NEW, supra note 182, at 1, 12.
189. Isabelle Guérin & G. Venkatasubramanian, Corridors of Migration and Chains of Dependence:
Brick Kiln Moulders in Tamil Nadu, in INDIA’S UNFREE WORKFORCE: OF BONDAGE OLD AND NEW,
supra note 182, at 170, 188; see also KARA, supra note 43, at 202 (highlighting an interview of one
bonded laborer who did not even bother with rehabilitation as these schemes were fraught with
corruption).
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the lack of access to credit or sufficient income for survival, with evidence to
suggest that they were worse off than before their rescue.190 This suggests that
closer attention should be paid to the politics of abolitionism, and that there is a
need to formulate a robust, redistributive agenda focused on workers’ rights,
instead of relying on victim rhetoric, weak rescue, and rehabilitation schemes. This
is a theme that is increasingly becoming salient as trafficked victims who have
benefited from anti-trafficking laws such as the VTVPA find that they are
increasingly prone not just to “unsafe and dangerous working conditions but also
to reexploitation.”191 Hence the call for a “realignment of our solutions from one
of ‘rescue’ to one of ‘harm reduction.’”192
Finally, if contemporary anti-trafficking discourse was to be reoriented
towards grasping the exploitation of both men and women in labor sectors other
than sex work, we could be at risk of ignoring the gendered harms of migration
and trafficked labor. After all, migration outcomes for women and men can differ
starkly. The sexual harassment of migrant women and the codes of honor in the
community they migrate from can often mean that they can never really return
“home.” Josmina’s suicide upon finding out that she is pregnant is an example.
Indeed, feminist scholars have problematized the distinction between “labor
trafficking” and “sex trafficking” in this context.193 Interestingly, the sole
amendment recently proposed to the ISMWA seeks to make the law genderneutral so that it can be made applicable to migrant women and children.194 While
the critique in relation to the invisibility of gender is essential, I argue that
gendered harm is today hyper-visible, which in turn can produce regressive
outcomes for women.195 To illustrate, the Indian National Commission for
Women recently suggested that the ISMWA be amended to allow for a family
member to accompany a female migrant at the employer’s expense. In fact, even
what appears to be an unequivocal sexual harm may reveal gains for women. For
example, in Blanchet’s study of Bangladeshi women who migrated for domestic
work or for bar dancing, and resorted to sex work, women in fact found that they
experienced greater control over working conditions, obtained higher pay, felt
valued, enjoyed male attention,196 and even found pleasure in sex work.197 Yet,
190. KARA, supra note 43, at 53, 61–62.
191. Brennan, supra note 10, at 1600, 1602. Brennan concludes that anti-trafficking activities
are “at their core, also pro-migrants’ rights.” Id. at 1608. In the domestic context, this would translate
into workers’ rights. For a similar argument framed as a critique of the rescue and rehabilitation
model, see Pope, supra note 137, at 1854–58.
192. PARREÑAS, supra note 30, at 24, 175.
193. See Barnhart, supra note 139, at 90–96.
194. See Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Amendment
Bill, 2011 (Bill No. XXXIV of 2011), PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, http://www.prsindia.org/
billtrack/the-inter-state-migrant-workmen-regulation-of-employment-and-conditions-of-service-bill-2011
-1912 (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
195. See RATNA KAPUR, MAKESHIFT MIGRANTS AND LAW: GENDER, BELONGING, AND
POSTCOLONIAL ANXIETIES 131–33 (2010).
196. BLANCHET, supra note 111, at 63–64.
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other women found that the reversal of gender roles, with the husband
performing household chores and bringing up the children while the wife earned
outside the home,198 enabled them to question their husbands’ authority. Thus, a
reduced focus on the gendered harms of migration may in fact render visible the
benefits of female migration.
D. De-Exceptionalizing Sex Work; Theorizing Exploitation
In the previous section, I de-exceptionalized trafficking and its routine
conflation with trafficking for sex work by offering an insight into a legal regime
that deals with the trafficking of both men and women into sectors other than sex
work. In this section, I draw on a specific ethnographic account of two Indian sex
markets to de-exceptionalize sex work as always inherently harmful in order to
pursue a theory of exploitation within this sector. As I stated earlier, there has
been far less discussion in the trafficking debates of the concept of exploitation
than the coercion/consent dynamic, despite its centrality to the U.N. Protocol’s
definition of trafficking and its mention as far back as the 1949 U.N. Convention.
Indeed, despite extensive feminist inputs into Protocol negotiations, the definition
of the term “exploitation” did not reflect the sophistication of either feminist or
non-feminist theorizing on exploitation.199 This lack of attention to the term
“exploitation” could well be because, since 1949, sex has been a key aspect of
international legal activity directed towards exploitation200 based on the likely
assumption that sex work is per se exploitative. Thus, the U.N. Protocol and the
VTVPA both list the minimum standard of exploitation by reference to slavery,
practices similar to slavery, and so on for labor markets other than sex work, but
offer no such minimum in the case of sex work. The U.N. Protocol, therefore,
betrays traces of the earlier legal imagination on trafficking in the context of the
moral panics of white slavery.201
For a de-exceptionalist account of sex work that seeks to identify exploitative
practices within the sex sector, O’Connell Davidson cautions:
[P]olicy debate on forced labour in the sex sector cannot be bracketed off
from debate on the more general regulation of that sector, any more than
the issue of “trafficking” can be treated in isolation from the more
general phenomenon of migration.
In the absence of debate on the specificity of sex work, the details of
labour regulation, and the minimum standards that should be applied to
the work of prostitutes, and on what constitutes an unacceptable level of

197.
198.
199.

Id. Mahdavi also echoes many of these insights. See MAHDAVI, supra note 30, at 125–47.
See BLANCHET, supra note 111, at 145–46.
See Vanessa E. Munro, Exploring Exploitation: Trafficking in Sex, Work and Sex Work, in
DEMANDING SEX, supra note 99, at 83, 87.
200. Susan Marks, Exploitation as an International Legal Concept, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 281, 294–95 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).
201. See id. at 299.
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“exploitation” within prostitution . . . it is dangerous to talk about forced
prostitution and sex slaves.202
It is precisely with a view towards identifying such exploitation within sex
work that I reflect briefly on the political economy of two sex markets that I have
studied in the past. More generally, in theorizing the parameters of exploitation,
Munro suggests two important components: (1) wrongful use involving
instrumentalization for achieving one’s ends; and (2) the disparity of value where the
beneficiary gains disproportionately at the cost of the exploited person.203 At least
three of the critical concepts of a theory of exploitation—instrumentalization,
coercion, and harm—figure prominently in the feminist sex work debates. The
radical feminist theory of sexual exploitation itself implicates all three in its
account of women’s sexual subordination and the constitutive harm of
commodification. Thus, it goes to the heart of the wrongful use aspect of the
theory of exploitation. Materialist feminists on the other hand, like Marxists, are
equally interested in the wrongful use and disparity of value involved in
exploitation.204 Much of this feminist scholarship, however, focuses far less on the
disparity of value at the transactional level within sex markets or the sex industry.
Without this analysis, though, it is difficult to contextualize and measure
exploitation, and this in turn produces generic regulatory proposals untailored to
specific economic scenarios. Feminists who do delineate the disparity of value
across a range of sex work transactions do so primarily in terms of the class
processes that mediate sex work. These typically include enslavement, directly and
indirectly employed, and self-employed or independent sex work.205 Elsewhere, I
have sought to build on this feminist analysis by suggesting that class processes
offer only a partial account of exploitation in the sex industry. I instead propose
the phrase “mode of organization” to convey the range of sociocultural meanings
that sex work assumes in its concrete institutional settings. In my study of the
political economy of sex work in Sonagachi, a Kolkata red-light area, and Tirupati,
described elsewhere,206 three modes of organization of sex work were featured in
both markets. In Sonagachi, these were the chhukri system (akin to bonded labor),
the adhiya system where the sex worker and the brothel-keeper split half the
income per sex work transaction (less costs payable to an agent, if any) and finally,
the self-employed mode. In Tirupati, on the other hand, sex workers
predominantly worked in the contractor mode or the self-employed mode. Rarely
did I hear of debt bondage there in recent years.
In addition to the mode of organization, the institutional setting in which sex
work is performed (e.g., the household, brothel, street, hospitality economy) is

202. O’Connell Davidson, supra note 127, at 19 (emphasis added).
203. Munro, supra note 199, at 84 (citing STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE: ETHICS
AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY TRADE 38 (2003)).
204. KOTISWARAN, supra note 18, at 242.
205. JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, PROSTITUTION, POWER AND FREEDOM 10 (1998).
206. KOTISWARAN, supra note 18, at 88–91.
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critical for assessing whether a sex worker is exploited. For one, the range of
internal and external stakeholders and the relational dynamics amongst them differ
dramatically in varied institutional settings. Other factors that determine the extent
of exploitation include the spatial concentration of sex work businesses and the
scale of the sex business, although in both Sonagachi and Tirupati the scale of the
sex business tended to be small. In other words, when compared to a sauna
establishment in the Philippines, which has between sixty and five hundred
employees,207 or a massage parlor in Bangkok with an average of under a hundred
employees,208 even large brothels in Sonagachi do not approach the lower end of
that number.
The self-employed mode of organization was evident in several institutional
settings where I studied sex work. This does not mean that these sex workers are
not exploited, only that the disparity in value when compared to sex workers in
the other two modes is lower, and that the sex workers themselves are notionally
in charge of the rate of exploitation. Similarly, the chhukri mode in Sonagachi
involves debt bondage and is, therefore, a “practice similar to slavery” in U.N.
Protocol terms. It does not, however, amount to slavery given sex workers’
mobility, especially compared to other modes within the sex industry.209 If one
were to consider the intermediate category of relations between slavery-like
practices and self-employed sex work, things get complicated. The terms used to
identify the intermediate class process—direct or indirect employment, enterprise
labor, the contractor mode, and the capitalist class process—do not translate easily
in the sex markets I studied. Instead, the boundaries between unfree labor, selfemployment, and wage labor were not absolute210 and may well have harbored
intermediate forms between wage labor and bonded labor.211
This leads me to conclude that an overarching theory of exploitation in sex
work is not possible given the heterogeneity of sex markets and the varied modes
of organization that mediate it.212 How then may one detect, measure, and
respond to exploitation appropriately? Exploitation could be measured in terms of
the three alternate situations to being exploited. According to Wilkinson,213 these
include (1) the pre-interactive baseline (the outcome had the parties to the
207. Rene E. Ofreneo & Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, Prostitution in the Philippines, in THE SEX
SECTOR: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASES OF PROSTITUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 100, 113
(Lin Lean Lim ed., 1998).
208. Wathinee Boonchalaski & Philip Guest, Prostitution in Thailand, in THE SEX SECTOR: THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASES OF PROSTITUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 207, at 130, 145.
209. See Heather S. Dell, Hierarchies of Femininity: Sex Workers, Feminists and the Nation
270 (Apr. 22, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with author).
210. Marcel Van der Linden, Globalising the Working-Class Concept, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF SOCIAL HISTORY 1, http://www.iisg.nl/labouragain/documents/vanderlinden.pdf (last visited
Aug. 8, 2013).
211. See id. at 5.
212. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 10–11 (expounding on the difficulties of coming up with
a “neutral, universal yardstick” for exploitation more generally).
213. Munro, supra note 199, at 85.
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transaction never met); (2) the closest possible world baseline (the outcome had
the exploited person entered into the same kind of transaction with someone
other than the exploiter); and (3) the normative baseline (the outcome that is
normatively desired for the exploited person). Doing sex work will invariably put
the sex worker above the pre-interactive baseline whether she resorts to it out of
dire poverty or “dull economic compulsion.”214 This is because the remuneration
in sex work is often a high multiple of the income from traditionally female
sectors of employment. This is a baseline that feminists would rightly argue
justifies the status quo, and therefore, is not one on which to base redistributive
efforts. Feminists, meanwhile, vehemently disagree over the normative baseline, as
some would seek to abolish sex work altogether while other pro-sex work
advocates would probably conform to the legal baseline of the U.N. Protocol and
work towards abolishing chhukri as a form of trafficking. However, a pro-sex work
feminist view of sex work might desire an expanded notion of exploitation. In this
case, feminists may endeavor to improve the closest possible world baseline for all
sex workers by ensuring that sex workers work under safe working conditions, as
well as produce, appropriate, and distribute as much of the surplus from sex work
amongst themselves as possible rather than to other stakeholders in the business.
For this, some basic understanding of the political economy of sex markets is
necessary, as is an appreciation of the unintended consequences of any form of
regulatory intervention, even if ostensibly beneficial.
E. Community-Based Anti-Trafficking Initiatives:
The Case of Self-Regulatory Boards in Sonagachi
A significant challenge for the future success of reformulating anti-trafficking
law lies in its implementation. As it is, even ten years since the adoption of the
U.N. Protocol, the UNODC has reported on the abysmally low conviction rates
for the offense of trafficking.215 I have argued, so far, that labor law is preferable
to criminal law in targeting trafficking.216 The ILO, in fact, notes that the labor
machinery increasingly has a more significant role to play in implementing antitrafficking law217 and recognizes the role of social partners such as employers and
214. Julia O’Connell Davidson, The Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution, 17 HYPATIA 84, 94 (2002).
215. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 67, at 85.
216. An advocate for the continued use of criminal law may however suggest that it is the
mode of criminal law enforcement that needs reform. Criminal law enforcement does not always need
to occur in a confrontational mode. The UK, for instance, adopts a multi-agency model to regulate
sex work involving coordination between the community police, service delivery agencies and sex
workers’ groups. Tracey Sagar, Tackling On-Street Sex Work: Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Sex Workers and
Inclusive Inter-Agency Initiatives, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 153, 156 (2007). Similarly, one
might propose the use of specialized courts such as drug courts to counter trafficking. A Trafficking
Court was recently set up in Mumbai, which deals with cases under the anti-sex work criminal law. US
Officials Impressed by Mumbai Anti-Trafficking Court: Wikileaks, TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 6, 2011), http://
articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-06/india/30118103_1_anti-trafficking-trafficking-cases
-conviction-rate.
217. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 73, ¶ 350.
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workers in combating forced labor and trafficking.218 Indeed, trade unions have
played a major role in countries like Australia in identifying exploitative labor
practices.219 Further, workers’ representatives were forceful in their recent call to
the ILO to supplement the Convention on Forced Labour through standard
setting with a view to targeting trafficking. In the Indian context, however, where
85% of the Indian working population is in the informal economy, conventional
forms of trade union mobilization are not necessarily effective. Even substantively
speaking, Indian labor laws geared towards the informal economy tend to have
been initiated by provincial state legislatures, and emphasize wages, social security,
and welfare for workers rather than, say, industrial relations, which is a
preoccupation of conventional labor laws.
It is in the context of localized sector-specific labor law reform on the one
hand, and the failure of the state to enforce laws relating to bonded, contract, and
migrant labor on the other, that attempts at self-regulation by workers assume
significance. Interestingly, in the case of sex workers, it is the very lack of the
recognition of sex work as a form of legitimate labor by the state, and the uneven
enforcement of the ITPA, that has produced a regulatory vacuum within which
novel attempts at self-regulation have taken root. I use the example of the selfregulatory boards that the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), an
organization of sixty thousand sex workers in the Indian state of West Bengal,
have set up to combat the trafficking of women and girls into Sonagachi. The role
of sex workers in anti-trafficking initiatives is counterintuitive,220 and is indeed
thought to extend the anti-trafficking agenda of the state through local
surveillance.221 Yet it warrants attention especially as governments are being called
upon to treat migrants not as victims or objects of government policies but as
partners in the formulation of relevant anti-trafficking policies and in finding an
alternative to slavery.222 Note here that anti-trafficking initiatives in relation to sex
workers in India are typically initiated by American Christian groups like IJM,
which undertake stealth raids in red-light areas to rescue and rehabilitate sex
workers. An extensive critique of such initiatives, which have been largely
ineffective, has emerged over the years.223
218.
219.

Id. ¶¶ 352, 377.
Elaine Pearson, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, Australia, in
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 47, at 43–44; see also Pope, supra note 137, at 1863–64.
220. Kristof, for example, quotes activists who denounce the DMSC as a front for brothelkeepers and traffickers. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 4, at 31.
221. Swati Ghosh, Surveillance in Decolonized Social Space: The Case of Sex-Workers in Bengal, SOC.
TEXT, Summer 2005, at 60–62.
222. See Dr. Jyoti Sanghera, GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN, Preface to
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 47, at ix–x; see also Pope, supra note 137, at 1859 (identifying the
need for worker self-activity in finding an alternative to slavery).
223. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed & Meena Seshu, “We Have the Right Not to be ‘Rescued’ . . .”: When
Anti-Trafficking Programmes Undermine the Health and Well-Being of Sex Workers, ANTI-TRAFFICKING
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DMSC has worked in Sonagachi for over fifteen years having initially
emerged from a highly successful HIV prevention project. DMSC has undertaken
welfare activities for its members ranging from providing health care and
education to sex workers and their children, to managing a credit cooperative, and
to actively lobbying the state and federal government to repeal the extant anti-sex
work criminal law, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1986, and recognize sex
work as legitimate work. In consonance with its aspirations to self-regulation,
perhaps as a nod to the high visibility of trafficking as an international policy
issue,224 and as a move towards securing its own legitimacy as a sex workers’
group, DMSC has set up self-regulatory boards (SRBs) in most of the red-light
areas that it works in. As of 2006, SRBs were operational in twenty-seven red-light
areas of Kolkata alone. The driving principles of this effort were opposition to the
buying and selling of girls/women, tricking them into sex work, forced
prostitution, and child prostitution, and the desire to treat women who wanted to
do sex work with respect. Consequently, trafficked, forced, and minor sex workers
were sent back to their families or provided with vocational training for alternate
means of employment, although their families often played a major role in their
trafficking. By the same token, sex workers who were found not to have been
trafficked were counseled about what to expect in sex work, typical rules of
brothels, the health hazards involved in sex work, the need to practice safe sex,
and the harassment that a sex worker might expect from the police, local
hooligans, and customers. The SRB mechanism largely depends on its locality for
its effectiveness. Once a victim is spotted in a red-light area, an emergency
meeting of the SRB is called where board members extensively interview the girl
or woman to ascertain the circumstances leading to her taking up sex work.
The SRBs are anchored in the sex worker community. Sex workers account
for 60% of the SRBs’ membership (including sex workers in the community as
well as DMSC peer educators and supervisors), while 40% of its members are
drawn from local government and include experts such as a local lawyer, doctor,
and social worker. At the state level, the steering committee of the SRBs oversees
the activities of SRBs in the red-light areas and includes, in addition to
representatives of local SRBs, a representative from the State Women’s
Commission, the State Human Rights Commission, and the Labor Commission.
The authority of the SRB is coalesced through the holding of monthly meetings,
and maintenance of records of its proceedings—monthly records of the number
of trafficked cases for each SRB, case histories of trafficked girls and women, and
handover papers in case the trafficked person chooses to stay in a government

REV., June 2012, at 161–64; Padma Govindan, Rethinking Emancipation: The Rhetorics of Slavery and
Politics of Freedom in Anti-Trafficking Work in India, 15 INTERVENTIONS INT’L J. POSTCOLONIAL STUD.
511, 511–29 (2013); Veronica Magar, Rescue and Rehabilitation: A Critical Analysis of Sex Workers’
Antitrafficking Response in India, 37 SIGNS 619, 621–23 (2012).
224. Magar, supra note 223, at 626–27.
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home. Apart from dealing with trafficked sex workers, the SRBs also have a social
welfare function, which ensures their acceptance in the community.
DMSC hopes that SRBs will regulate conditions within the sex industry in
the future. They claim sex workers are on par with professionals like doctors and
lawyers who self-regulate through the Indian Medical Association and the Bar
Council of India, respectively. This claim to expertise is particularly resonant in the
case of the SRBs’ anti-trafficking mandate, for it is the resident sex workers in a
red-light area who are most likely to know of new entrants to the business.225
SRBs formulate norms of self-governance to reflect sex workers’ experiences. For
an SRB, only a sex worker who is compelled into sex work by another person is
trafficked, not a woman entering it out of force of circumstance. Similarly, DMSC
claims that sex workers empathize with trafficked women and girls such that they
will go to any lengths to prevent a trafficked sex worker from being apprehended
by the police and sent to a state home where she will be subject to physical and
sexual abuse. Also, when there is a difference of opinion (say as to the age of the
trafficked person) within the Board, a sex worker’s opinion is considered to be
more valuable due to her experience in the industry.
Support for SRBs in the red-light areas has come slowly. Predictably, brothel
keepers were initially against the idea, believing that DMSC passed on information
about trafficked sex workers and minors to the police, thereby instigating raids.
They also suspected DMSC of trying to abolish sex work altogether. However,
over the years, given that trafficking is one of the few reasons for police raids at
least in Sonagachi,226 DMSC claims that brothel-keepers have, in their own
interest, refrained from trafficking sex workers. Landlords also put pressure on
brothel-keepers who harbored minors or trafficked women for fear of arrest and
prosecution. Brothel keepers worry that their competitors may tip off the SRB.227
Thus, it is clear that the state’s enforcement practices, in combination with
community-based mechanisms, can shift social norms within sex markets fairly
significantly. Threats of police involvement and legal interventions are highly
persuasive in community-based anti-trafficking efforts.228 Given the local
anchoring of the SRB in a red-light area, traffickers are also sometimes
apprehended by sex workers in the community. When quizzed about the
possibility of maintaining a trafficker database and other forms of public shaming
which are currently in vogue, the DMSC peer educator I spoke to confirmed that
this was not necessary because traffickers often panic when apprehended by
DMSC and beg to be pardoned. This suggests that traffickers are not part of an
organized crime network, but rather, operate on an individual basis.
Any assessment of the SRB mechanism initiated by DMSC partly depends

225.
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 627.
See KOTISWARAN, supra note 18, at 177.
This is confirmed by Magar, supra note 223, at 628.
See id. at 630.
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on what preceded it. Earlier, police raids in red-light areas were instigated by the
need to locate minors in sex work. The police would typically send away the
better-looking sex workers to corrective institutions under the ITPA whether they
were minors or not. There, women were tortured and sexually harassed to provide
sexual favors for personnel.229 Brothel-keepers and agents would pose as relatives
and pay bribes to secure their release, which was used to further indebt the sex
worker to the brothel. The remaining women, who sought to assist with their
trafficker’s prosecution, were often threatened by the police with physical violence
if they did not reveal the trafficker’s identity.230 Moreover, women feared the
police, for if they were to repatriate the woman to her village or hometown, her
trafficked status would become public knowledge for which she would be
ostracized. Police raids earlier also reduced the customer footfall in red light areas
and undermined HIV prevention efforts by pushing sex workers desperate for
income to engage in risky sexual practices. It is for these reasons that DMSC
continues to be highly hesitant to hand over trafficked women and girls to the
police. Thus, it is plausible that SRBs, in preventing the trafficking of minor and
forced sex workers, are minimizing the incidence of police raids, and are hence
having an impact in their respective red-light areas.
DMSC is keen to register the SRBs and its steering committee with the state
and set up its own rehabilitation/short stay home to step up its anti-trafficking
efforts, rather than submit to the unpredictable outcomes of a police-driven
process. Yet, on a day-to-day basis, the police are respectful and sometimes even
direct sex workers to approach their local SRB first with their dispute. Similarly,
some state officials have expressed support for this highly efficient, low cost
method of stepping up anti-trafficking efforts. International organizations such as
the UNDP and Action Aid have aided this innovative method of anti-trafficking.
When evaluating the potential for success of DMSC’s anti-trafficking efforts,
we need to bear in mind the limited resources at their disposal. Monetary
resources are obvious impediments that affect the repatriation of victims from
both within India and neighboring countries. The other inbuilt limitation of SRBs
is that they are likely to be more effective in spatially concentrated sex markets
such as red-light areas, rather than the dispersed sex markets found in Southern
India. Even in red-light areas, some boards are more effective than others. In a
highly differentiated market like Sonagachi, DMSC has faced obstacles to its SRBs
from high-end brothels in affluent parts of Sonagachi where brothel-keepers
routinely groom young girls to do sex work, paying little attention to DMSC,
which is viewed as representing poorer sex workers. Also, despite the claim that

229. This continues elsewhere in India. See Sujata Gothoskar, Women’s Work, Stigma, Shelter
Homes and the State, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Jan. 26, 2013, at L-21, L-22.
230. For example, women are known to “engineer[] spectacular escapes, including using
knotted bedsheets to climb out of windows and setting fire to the building.” Govindan, supra note
223, at 518 (citing Noy Thrupkaew, The Crusade Against Sex Trafficking, THE NATION (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.thenation.com/article/crusade-against-sex-trafficking).
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DMSC controls Sonagachi,231 in reality, they are not always able to counter the
deep-rooted nexus between the local clubs, political parties, agents, brothel
keepers, and hooligans.
Moreover, DMSC is an organization that is run by sex workers, some of who
maintain sex workers on an adhiya basis (where income is split between the brothel
keeper and the sex worker).232 Hence, it is not surprising that these institutions of
self-governance reflect the logic of the market. To illustrate, DMSC had rescued a
trafficked minor from a brothel in Sonagachi who was sent home to her family. A
few years later, the brothel-keeper approached DMSC seeking permission to reemploy the same girl, who was no longer a minor, under pressure from her
parents who needed her income. DMSC has thus found itself in the position of a
gate-keeper to the industry. It has responded to such requests so far on an ad-hoc
basis.233 On the other hand, SRBs’ zero tolerance for child prostitution in the redlight area could be viewed as reflecting sex workers’ opposition to competition
from younger sex workers. In conclusion, while the effectiveness of the SRB
mechanism is yet to be determined, it would be premature to dismiss it out of
hand as a front for traffickers. This is especially true because an anti-trafficking
strategy that is deeply familiar with the local dynamics of a labor market and that
selectively uses the force of state law to shift norms within the market is more
likely to be successful. Perhaps, as the Network of Sex Work Projects reminds us:
“Sex workers: [are] part of the solution.”234
CONCLUSION
The problem of human trafficking has received unprecedented attention in
recent years. As images of modern day slavery proliferate the news media at a
rapid pace, repeatedly inscribing the typical trafficking episode in the popular
consciousness, states and civil society organizations have been hard at work in
pushing international law to take notice. Feminists in particular succeeded in this
respect when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.N. Protocol in 2000.
Feminists have, however, become victims of our own success. Over the past
decade, powerful Western states invested in a project of border control have acted
along with a conservative U.S. administration interested in opposing prostitution
worldwide to crack down on a very selective form of trafficking, namely,
trafficking for sex work. The use of a prohibitionist international law, or what
Kristof calls the big-stick approach,235 to target a highly complex and fluid

231. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 4, at 32.
232. See Prabha Kotiswaran, Born unto Brothels: Toward a Legal Ethnography of Sex Work in an
Indian Red-light Area, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 579, 585 (2008).
233. See also Magar, supra note 223, at 628 (discussing peer educators who are sometimes
reluctant to antagonize brothel-keepers, preferring instead to counsel continuously until “they
understand [the law and what is ethical]”).
234. DOEZEMA, supra note 2, at 174.
235. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 4, at 34–37.
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phenomenon like trafficking, which is itself embedded in global flows of migrants,
refugees, and women in search of better life prospects, has produced significant
negative human rights externalities on the ground. The benefits of the antitrafficking regime for trafficked persons are not clear either. Moreover, prospects
for discussing these deleterious effects, much less taking action to stem them,
appear low given that abolitionist rhetoric is backed by powerful political actors
and funding sanctions, and because there is a lack of mechanisms to objectively
assess the evidence as to the effects of these initiatives.236 Thus, although the
increased state attention to contemporary forms of exploitation is “reason for
reflection, not rejection or denial,”237 it is an inescapable fact that despite our best
efforts, the U.N. Protocol and most of the domestic legal initiatives following
from it have been hostage to both ideological as well as institutional priorities, few
of which reflect the interests of women.
The central predicament now facing us is whether we should work towards
reforming the U.N. Protocol framework, or if we are better off training our
energies elsewhere, say for instance, towards international labor law mechanisms?
The response to the U.N. Protocol after all has been tremendous according to
human rights activists like Gallagher who have justified its benefits238 despite its
drawbacks.239 Gallagher insists that the U.N. Protocol is only the first step in the
development of “a comprehensive international legal framework comprising
regional treaties, abundant interpretive guidance, a range of policy instruments and
a canon of state practice.”240 While it is debatable whether this emerging body of
anti-trafficking law demonstrates a “relatively high level of consistency with
international standards,”241 its relatively fluid form does offer possibilities for
intervention. It is precisely with a view to such intervention that I have elaborated
on domestic anti-trafficking law already on the books in a developing country like
India, with its large-scale internal migration profile. The proposed standard setting
by the ILO to the Forced Labor Convention offers much hope in this respect.
As domestic legal regimes consider trafficking law reform, I propose actively
236. See Chuang, supra note 17, at 1710.
237. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 828.
238. For instance, Gallagher points to the legislative attention that trafficking has garnered in
the aftermath of the U.N. Protocol. She cites a recent UNODC report, which reports that 125
countries in the survey had anti-trafficking legislation. Id. at 813 n.100 (citing UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 10, at 22). Forty-five percent of the surveyed countries
adopted these laws only after the U.N. Protocol entered into force in December 2003. Id. In 2003,
only five percent of the 155 countries surveyed by UNODC had a national plan to deal with
trafficking. By 2008, this increased to fifty-three percent. Id. at 830 n.172. Fifty-two percent of the 155
countries had established a specialist law enforcement response to trafficking in persons. Id. at 830
n.173. Prosecution for trafficking-related offenses however continued to remain extremely low. Id. at
830 n.174. For a view that is less sanguine about the viability of the human rights approach to
trafficking, see Juss, supra note 121, at 294–95 (arguing that there is nothing in the U.N. Protocol that
guides courts on how to respond to protect victims of trafficking).
239. Gallagher, supra note 25, at 831.
240. Id. at 791.
241. Id.
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expanding the narrow focus of current anti-trafficking efforts away from the top
of the pyramid of anti-trafficking law, targeting scenarios involving strong
coercion and strong exploitation, and instead pushing downwards towards the
range of other trafficking scenarios. The momentum around trafficking issues will
not only help re-envision international anti-trafficking law, but will also offer the
perfect opportunity to invigorate the enforcement of domestic labor laws against
trafficking, which have been rendered dormant with the onslaught of neoliberal
economic reforms. There has been some concern about such an expansive
interpretation of the definition of trafficking,242 yet it is a chance worth taking for
purposes of locating and assessing the normative desires of anti-trafficking law.
After all, domestic legal mediations of notions of coercion and exploitation in the
trafficking context vary widely, as I have demonstrated in the Indian case, and
there is no reason to constrain these unduly as the jurisprudence of anti-trafficking
law emerges. Similarly, fostering plurality in the regulatory mechanism such that
labor law is at the center, coupled with the highly selective use of criminal law
penalties, informed in turn by a granular understanding of the political economy
and legal topography of labor markets is likely to be more effective. A deeper
understanding of the economics driving labor markets and the highly
counterintuitive effects of legal responses to forced migration and exploitative
working conditions in labor markets243 is crucial to developing effective antitrafficking law. Ultimately, the recognition of the varied stakes that developing and
developed countries have in anti-trafficking law, and the reorientation of antitrafficking law away from a criminalization model to a labor model, may indeed
prove to be a crucial axis around which the success of the U.N. Protocol hinges.

242. See Gallagher, supra note 31, at 385.
243. For an excellent example of such analysis of the brick markets in Afghanistan, which
employ bonded labor, see INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 182, at 16.
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